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I. IN TRODUCTION
The M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt recently held in Sta te v.Chute 2
that ev idence ob tained w ithou t a w arrant from a p lain-s ight
inv es tigation ofa p ers on’s driv ew ay , w hich is im p liedly op en to the
p u b lic, is the res u lt of an u nreas onab le s earch u nder the Fou rth
Am endm ent and, therefore, m u s t b e s u p p res s ed.3 Ap p ly ing the Dunn
factors ,4 the m ajority fou nd the driv ew ay ofa hou s e to b e w ithin the
hou s e’s cu rtilage, w hich is p rotected from u nreas onab le s earches
u nder the Fou rth Am endm ent.5 Ev en thou gh the driv ew ay w as
im p liedly op en to the p u b lic and the p olice officer cou ld reas onab ly
s u rm is e,from a p lain v iew ofthe driv ew ay ,that it w as s toring a s tolen
cam p er, the m ajority held that the officer cou ld not s tay on the
driv ew ay to v erify the cam p er’s identity .6 The cou rt decided to
ex clu de allev idence regarding the s tolen cam p er w ithou t cons idering
that the officer w ou ld hav e inev itab ly dis cov ered that the cam p er w as
s tolen,ev en ifhe did not engage in any u nlaw fu lcondu ct.7
This cas e note b egins b y ex p loring the his tory ofthe right to b e
free from u nreas onab le s earches b y the gov ernm ent in Am erica.In
doing s o, it v is its the ex clu s ionary ru le— deriv ed from the Fou rth
Am endm ent— and s om e ofthe relev ant ju ris p ru dence ap p ly ing the
ex cep tions and elab orations ofthe ru le.8 This cas e note then dis cu s s es
the facts and p rocedu ralhis tory ofChute 9 and ex p lains the cou rt’s
reas oning for its decis ion.1 0 N ex t, it argu es that the cou rt m is ap p lied
2. 90 8 N .W .2d 57 8 (M inn.20 1 8 ).
3 . Se e id .at 5 8 8 .
4 . Se e United States v .Du nn, 4 8 0 U.S.294 , 3 0 1 (1 98 7 ) (“[1 .] the p rox im ity of
the area claim ed to b e cu rtilage to the hom e,[2.] w hether the area is inclu ded w ithin
an enclos u re s u rrou nding the hom e, [3 .] the natu re ofthe u s es to w hich the area is
p u t, and [4 .] the s tep s taken b y the res ident to p rotect the area from ob s erv ation b y
p eop le p as s ing b y .”).
5. Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 3 –8 5 .
6. Se e id .at 5 8 5–8 8 .
7 . Se e id .at 5 8 8 ;se e a lsodis cu s s ion infra Section IV.B.
8 . Se e dis cu s s ion infra Part II.
9. Se e dis cu s s ion infra Section III.A.
1 0 . Se e dis cu s s ion infra Section III.B.
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federalp recedent,1 1 m is s ed an op p ortu nity to ap p ly the inev itab le
dis cov ery ru le,1 2 and dev iated from M innes ota’s p rior p recedent in
ap p ly ing the ex clu s ionary ru le to the facts ofChute .1 3 This argu m ent
leads to the conclu s ion that the cou rt’s ru ling w illcreate u nreas onab le
difficu lties for p ros ecu tion in the fu tu re.1 4
II. H ISTORY OF “UN REASON ABLE SEARCH”UN DER TH E FOURTH
AM EN DM EN T
A. The Fourth Am e nd m e nt’sProte c tionAg a instUnre a sona b le
Se a rc he s
The Fou rth Am endm ent to the U.S.Cons titu tion p rotects “[t]he
right ofthe p eop le to b e s ecu re in their p ers ons , hou s es , p ap ers , and
effects , agains t u nreas onab le s earches and s eiz u res .”1 5 A s im ilar
p rotection is fou nd in Article 1 , Section 1 0, of the M innes ota
Cons titu tion.1 6 H is torically , the rem edy av ailab le to a v ictim of an
u nreas onab le s earch w as lim ited to either s elf-help or com m encing a
s u it for com m on-law tres p as s .1 7 Accordingly , u ntil the tw entieth
centu ry ,ev idence ob tained from u nreas onab le s earches cou ld not b e
ex clu ded u nder the Fou rth Am endm ent.1 8
1 1 . Se e dis cu s s ion infra Section IV.A.
1 2. Se e dis cu s s ion infra Section IV.B.
1 3 . Se e dis cu s s ion infra Section IV.C.–D.
1 4 . Se e dis cu s s ion infra Part V.
1 5. U.S.CON ST.am end.IV.
1 6. Se e M IN N .CON ST.art.I, § 1 0 (“The right ofthe p eop le to b e s ecu re in their
p ers ons ,hou s es ,p ap ers ,and effects agains t u nreas onab le s earches and s eiz u res .”).
1 7 . Utah v .Strieff, 1 3 6 S.Ct.20 56, 2060–61 (201 6) (citing Thom as Y.Dav ies ,
Re cove ring the Orig ina l Fourth Am e nd m e nt, 9 8 M ICH . L. REV. 54 7 , 625 (1 999))
(“Becau s e officers w ho v iolated the Fou rth Am endm ent w ere traditionally
cons idered tres p as s ers , indiv idu als s u b ject to u ncons titu tionals earches or s eiz u res
his torically enforced their rights throu gh tort s u its or s elf-help .”).
1 8 . Se e Collins v .Virginia,1 3 8 S.Ct.1 663 ,1 67 6 (201 8 ) (Thom as ,J.,concu rring)
(“The ex clu s ionary ru le— the p ractice ofdeterring illegals earches and s eiz u res b y
s u p p res s ing ev idence at crim inaltrials — did not ex is t.N o s u ch ru le ex is ted in ‘Rom an
Law , N ap oleonic Law or ev en the Com m on Law ofEngland.’And this Cou rt did not
adop t the federal ex clu s ionary ru le u ntil the 20 th centu ry .” (citations om itted)).
Before the cou rts adop ted the ex clu s ionary ru le, if ev idence w as “com p etent or
p ertinent,” it w ou ld hav e b een adm itted, regardles s of “the law fu lnes s or
u nlaw fu lnes s of the m ode, b y w hich it [w as ] ob tained.” United States v .La Jeu ne
Eu genie,26 F.Cas .8 3 2,8 4 3 –4 4 (C.C.D.M as s .1 8 22) (N o.1 5,551 ).The only lim itation
on the adm is s ib ility ofs u ch ev idence w as that the ev idence cou ld not b e “created b y
3
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The U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt firs t articu lated the ex clu s ionary ru le,
w hich renders ev idence ob tained throu gh u nreas onab le s earches
inadm is s ib le, in W e e ksv.Unite d Sta te s.1 9 The ex clu s ionary ru le w as
adop ted to ens u re ju dicialintegrity and to “av oid ev en the s lightes t
ap p earance of [the ju diciary ] s anctioning illegal gov ernm ent
condu ct.”20 Althou gh the W e e ks ex clu s ionary ru le initially ap p lied
only in federalp ros ecu tions that inv olv ed b oth s tate and federallaw
enforcem ent officers ,21 it ev entu ally ex p anded to “ev idence s eiz ed b y
s tate law enforcem ent officers du ring a s earch that, ifcondu cted b y
federalofficers , w ou ld hav e v iolated the Fou rth Am endm ent.”22 At
that p oint, how ev er, and at leas t u p to 1 94 9, “3 1 States rejected the
W e e ks doctrine, [and] 1 6 States [w e]re in agreem ent w ith it.”23
Finally , throu gh M a pp v.Unite d Sta te s, the Cou rt ru led that “all
ev idence ob tained b y s earches and s eiz u res in v iolation of the
Cons titu tion is , b y that s am e au thority , inadm is s ib le in a s tate
cons traint,or op p res s ion,s u ch as confes s ions ex torted b y threats or frau d.”Se e id .at
8 4 4 .
1 9. 23 2 U.S.3 8 3 , 3 91 –94 (1 91 4 ); se e a lso W olf v .Colorado, 3 3 8 U.S.25, 28
(1 94 9) (“In W e e ksv.Unite d Sta te s,...this Cou rt held that in a federalp ros ecu tion the
Fou rth Am endm ent b arred the u s e ofev idence s ecu red throu gh an illegals earch and
s eiz u re.This ru ling w as m ade for the firs t tim e in 1 91 4 .It w as not deriv ed from the
ex p licit req u irem ents of the Fou rth Am endm ent; it w as not b as ed on legis lation
ex p res s ing Congres s ionalp olicy in the enforcem ent ofthe Cons titu tion.The decis ion
w as a m atter ofju dicialim p lication.Since then it has b een freq u ently ap p lied and w e
s tou tly adhere to it.”), ove rrule d on othe r g round s b y M ap p v .Ohio, 3 67 U.S.64 3
(1 961 ).
20 . United States v .Calandra,4 1 4 U.S.3 3 8 ,3 60 (1 97 4 ) (Brennan,J.,dis s enting);
se e a lsoTerry v .Ohio,3 92 U.S.1 ,1 3 (1 968 ) (“Cou rts w hich s it u nder ou r Cons titu tion
cannot and w illnot b e m ade p arty to law les s inv as ions ofthe cons titu tionalrights of
citiz ens b y p erm itting u nhindered gov ernm entalu s e ofthe fru its ofs u ch inv as ions .”).
21 . Se e ,e .g .,Lu s tig v .United States ,3 3 8 U.S.7 4 ,7 8 –7 9 (1 94 9) (p lu rality op inion)
(ap p ly ing the Bya rs doctrine to hold that the ex clu s ionary ru le ap p lied b ecau s e a
federalagent had p articip ated in the s earch);By ars v .United States ,27 3 U.S.28 ,3 2–
3 4 (1 927 ) (holding that b ecau s e the federalagent p articip ated in the w rongfu ls earch
and s eiz u re, the federalgov ernm ent cou ld not “av ailits elf of ev idence [that w as ]
im p rop erly s eiz ed”).
22. 2 DAVID S. RUDSTEIN , C. PETER ERLIN DER, DAVID C. TH OM AS, CRIM IN AL
CON STITUTION ALLAW § 1 1 .02 n.3 8 (M atthew Bender 20 1 8 ).
23 . W olf,3 3 8 U.S.at 29.
4
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cou rt.”24 Thu s , u nder M a pp, the ex clu s ionary ru le w as deriv ed from
the cons titu tionalp rotection afforded b y the Fou rth Am endm ent.25
Althou gh the U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt generally allow s the ex clu s ion
of ev idence ob tained from an u nreas onab le s earch in crim inal
p roceedings ,26 the Cou rt has q u es tioned w hether this s u p p res s ion of
ev idence u nder the ex clu s ionary ru le is “a p ers onal cons titu tional
right.”27 Becau s e the ru le is not fou nd any w here in the tex t of the
Cons titu tion,and “p os tdates the fou nding b y m ore than a centu ry ,”28
in Da visv.Unite d Sta te s,the Cou rt cam e to reject the “ex p ans iv e dicta”
in the line ofcas es s u gges ting that the ex clu s ionary ru le is “a s elf-
ex ecu ting m andate im p licit in the Fou rth Am endm ent its elf.”29
Ins tead, the Cou rt, in Da vis, recogniz ed the ex clu s ionary ru le to b e “a
‘ju dicially created rem edy ’ofthis Cou rt’s ow n m aking.”3 0
N oting that the focu s ofthe inq u iry u nder the ex clu s ionary ru le
s hou ld b e on the “flagrancy ofthe p olice m is condu ct,” the Cou rt has
continu ed to ap p ly the ru le w henev er ju s tice s o dem ands .3 1 This is
24 . 3 67 U.S.at 655 (holding that the Fou rth Am endm ent m u s t b e enforceab le
agains t the s tates “b y the s am e s anction ofex clu s ion as is u s ed agains t the Federal
Gov ernm ent,” p rov iding deterrence and the ins u rance of ju dicial integrity as
ju s tification).
25. Se e id .at 655–56.
26. Se e ,e .g ., Safford Unified Sch.Dis t.N o.1 v .Redding, 55 7 U.S.3 64 (200 9)
(holding that ev idence collected from a s trip s earch of a s tu dent at s chool w as
inadm is s ib le du e to the u nreas onab le m ethod ofthe s earch);Silv erthorne Lu m b er Co.
v .United States ,25 1 U.S.3 8 5 (1 920) (es tab lis hing ev idence gathered from an indirect
res u lt ofan u nlaw fu ls earch m u s t b e ex clu ded);W eeks v .United States ,23 2 U.S.3 8 3 ,
3 91 –94 (1 91 4 ) (finding that ev idence collected w ithou t a s earch w arrant b as ed on
p rob ab le cau s e is inadm is s ib le).
27 . United States v .Calandra, 4 1 4 U.S.3 3 8 , 3 4 8 (1 97 4 ) (conclu ding that the
ex clu s ionary ru le is a “rem edialdev ice”w hich does not “p ros crib e the u s e ofillegally
s eiz ed ev idence in allp roceedings or agains t allp ers ons ,” and m u s t go throu gh a
“b alancing p roces s ” w eighing the efficacy of its “rem edialob jectiv es ” agains t the
“im p os ition ofa crim inals anction on the v ictim ofthe s earch”).
28 . Collins v .Virginia, 1 3 8 S.Ct.1 663 , 1 67 7 (20 1 8 ) (Thom as , J., concu rring)
(citations om itted).
29. 564 U.S.229,23 7 –3 8 (20 1 1 ) (rejecting the “ex p ans iv e dicta”that deriv ed the
ex clu s ionary ru le im p licitly from the Fou rth Am endm ent in:M a pp, 3 67 U.S.at 655;
Olm s tead v .United States ,27 7 U.S.4 3 8 ,4 62 (1 928 )).
3 0 . Id .at 23 8 (q u oting Ca la nd ra , 4 1 4 U.S. at 3 4 8 ). For a dis cu s s ion of this
dis tinction b etw een the ex clu s ionary ru le b eing a ju dicially created doctrine v ers u s a
p ers onal,cons titu tionalright,s ee dis cu s s ion infra Section IV.A.2.
3 1 . Se e id .(“W hen the p olice ex hib it delib erate, reckles s , or gros s ly negligent
dis regard for Fou rth Am endm ent rights ,the deterrent v alu e ofex clu s ion is s trong and
tends to ou tw eigh the res u lting cos ts .Bu t w hen the p olice act w ith an ob jectiv ely
5
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grou nded in p rincip les of du e p roces s and p rotection of an
indiv idu al’s legitim ate and reas onab le ex p ectations ofp riv acy .3 2 Still,
w hat cons titu tes an u nreas onab le s earch rem ains a gray , and
s om etim es contradictory , area of Fou rth Am endm ent
ju ris p ru dence.3 3
B. The Ope n-Fie ld sDoc trine
Althou gh the u nreas onab lenes s of a s earch of an indiv idu al’s
p ers on or p rop erty is a heav ily litigated top ic, certain areas and
circu m s tances clearly fall ou ts ide the s cop e of the Fou rth
Am endm ent’s p rotection. State intru s ions and s earches on “op en
fields ” are not p rotected b y the Fou rth Am endm ent b ecau s e it is not
reas onab le to hav e ex p ectations ofp riv acy in op en fields .3 4 Thu s , an
officer can enter and s earch an op en field w ithou t a w arrant.3 5
reas onab le good-faith b elief that their condu ct is law fu l, or w hen their condu ct
inv olv es only s im p le, is olated negligence, the deterrence rationale los es m u ch ofits
force, and ex clu s ion cannot p ay its w ay .” (citations and internalq u otation m arks
om itted)).
3 2. Se e Oliv er v .United States ,4 66 U.S.1 7 0 ,1 8 7 (1 9 8 4 ) (M ars hall,J.,dis s enting)
(“The lib erty s hielded b y the Fou rth Am endm ent,as w e hav e often acknow ledged,is
freedom from u nreas onab le gov ernm ent intru s ions into ...legitim ate ex p ectations of
p riv acy .”(citation and internalq u otation m arks om itted));United States v .Chadw ick,
4 3 3 U.S.1 , 7 (1 97 7 );Katz v .United States , 3 8 9 U.S.3 4 7 , 3 61 –62 (1 967 ) (H arlan, J.,
concu rring).
3 3 . Se e g e ne ra llyAkhilReed Am ar,Fourth Am e nd m e ntFirstPrinciple s,1 0 7 H ARV.
L.REV.7 5 7 (1 994 ) (criticiz ing the Su p rem e Cou rt’s Fou rth Am endm ent ju ris p ru dence
and p rop os ing an alternativ e ap p roach to the am endm ent’s interp retation and
ap p lication).
3 4 . Se e Olive r,4 66 U.S.at 1 7 9;Ka tz,3 8 9 U.S.at 3 61 (H arlan,J.,concu rring) (“[A]
m an’s hom e is , for m os t p u rp os es , a p lace w here he ex p ects p riv acy , b u t ob jects ,
activ ities , or s tatem ents that he ex p os es to the ‘p lain v iew ’ of ou ts iders are not
‘p rotected’b ecau s e no intention to keep them to him s elfhas b een ex hib ited.”);H es ter
v .United States , 265 U.S.57 , 58 (1 924 ) (holding that rev enu e officers cou ld law fu lly
enter defendant’s op en fields to ob s erv e him s elling liq u or illegally ).
3 5. Olive r, 4 66 U.S.at 1 7 3 , 1 8 4 (finding a m ariju ana field, located a m ile from
p etitioner’s hom e and s u rrou nded b y “N o Tres p as s ing” s igns , to b e an op en field
w here the p rotection ofthe Fou rth Am endm ent did not reach).
6
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1. Orig insofthe Ope n-fie ld sDoc trine
The op en-fields doctrine finds its origin in H e ste r v.Unite d
Sta te s,3 6 w here the U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt held there w as no s eiz u re ofa
ju g containing illegally dis tilled m oons hine w his key — ob tained and
ex am ined w ithou t a w arrant b y officers on land b elonging to
defendant’s father— b ecau s e the ju g w as in an “op en field” to w hich
Fou rth Am endm ent p rotection did not ex tend.3 7 Then, in Olive r v.
Unite d Sta te s(the s em inalU.S.Su p rem e Cou rt decis ion regarding the
op en-fields doctrine), the Cou rt w ent s o far as to hold that
gov ernm ent intru s ion in an indiv idu al’s p rop erty op en to the p u b lic
does not ev en cons titu te a s earch w ithin the m eaning ofthe Fou rth
Am endm ent, ev en if that intru s ion w ou ld cons titu te com m on-law
tres p as s .3 8 The Olive rCou rt als o ex p lained that an area does not need
to b e “‘op en’nor a ‘field’as thos e term s are u s ed in com m on s p eech,”
to b e cons idered an op en field for p u rp os es of the Fou rth
Am endm ent.3 9
Fu rtherm ore,the Olive rCou rt reas oned agains t adop ting a cas e-
b y -cas e ap p roach to determ ine w hether an area is an op en field
b ecau s e ofthe difficu lties and com p lications p os ed b y s u ch an ad hoc
analy s is to the p racticalneeds oflaw enforcem ent officers .4 0 Rather,
the Cou rt ex p ou nded s om e cru cial factors that hav e his torically
as s is ted cou rts in determ ining w hether there can b e a reas onab le
ex p ectation ofp riv acy in a giv en location, w ithou t giv ing too m u ch
3 6. United States v .W illiam s ,N o.1 :1 7 -CR-4 1 ,20 1 7 W L3 528 955,at *2 (E.D.Tex .
Ju ly 27 , 201 7 ) (“The ‘op en fields ’ doctrine, [w as ] firs t enu nciated b y the Su p rem e
Cou rt in H e ste rv.U.S.”(citation om itted)).
3 7 . 265 U.S.at 59 (“[T]he s p ecialp rotection accorded b y the Fou rth Am endm ent
to the p eop le in their ‘p ers ons ,hou s es ,p ap ers ,and effects ,’is notex tended to the op en
fields .The dis tinction b etw een the latter and the hou s e is as old as the com m on law .”).
3 8 . Olive r,4 66 U.S.at 1 8 3 –8 4 .
3 9. Id .at 1 8 0 n.1 1 .
4 0 . Id .at 1 8 1 –8 2 (“The ad hoc ap p roach not only m akes it difficu lt for the
p olicem an to dis cern the s cop e of his au thority , ...it als o creates a danger that
cons titu tionalrights w illb e arb itrarily and ineq u itab ly enforced.”(citation om itted));
se e a lsoN ew York v .Belton,4 53 U.S.4 54 ,4 5 8 –60 (1 98 1 ) (“A highly s op his ticated s et
ofru les ,q u alified b y alls orts ofifs ,ands ,and b u ts and req u iring the draw ing ofs u b tle
nu ances and hairline dis tinctions ,m ay b e the s ort ofheady s tu ffu p on w hich the facile
m inds of law y ers and ju dges eagerly feed, b u t they m ay b e literally im p os s ib le of
ap p lication b y the officer in the field.” (citations and internal q u otations m arks
om itted)); Rob b ins v .California, 4 53 U.S.4 20 , 4 3 0 (1 98 1 ) (Pow ell, J., concu rring);
Du naw ay v .N ew York, 4 4 2 U.S.200 , 21 3 –1 4 (1 97 9);United States v .Rob ins on, 4 1 4
U.S.21 8 ,23 5 (1 97 3 ).
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w eight to any one factor.4 1 Ultim ately , thes e factors hav e gu ided the
Cou rt in identify ing a location as an op en field that falls ou ts ide the
s cop e ofthe Fou rth Am endm ent’s p rotection.4 2
2. Justific a tionforthe Ope n-fie ld sDoctrine
The rationale for the op en-fields doctrine is that law enforcem ent
officials enjoy the s am e right of acces s to op en fields as does the
p u b lic.4 3 Additionally , the Cou rt has determ ined it w ou ld b e
u nreas onab le to u p hold p riv acy rights for the s p ecificp u rp os es ofthe
Fou rth Am endm ent w here otherw is e there is no dis cernib le
ex p ectation of p riv acy .4 4 This is cons is tent w ith the his torical
u nders tanding of the Fou rth Am endm ent’s s tandard of p rotection,
that the Am endm ent’s p rotections are rooted in a p ers on’s
“reas onab le ex p ectation of p riv acy .”4 5 And b ecau s e “op en fields do
not p rov ide the s etting for thos e intim ate activ ities [that w arrant a
legitim ate need for p riv acy ] that the Am endm ent is intended to
s helter from gov ernm ent interference or s u rv eillance,” ev idence
ob tained from op en fields is generally adm is s ib le.4 6
This focu s on reas onab le ex p ectation ofp riv acy deriv es p rim arily
from the Cou rt’s landm ark decis ion in Ka tzv.Unite d Sta te s, w here the
reas onab le-ex p ectation-of-p riv acy tes t originated.4 7 Ka tzals o is w ell
know n for holding that b ecau s e “the Fou rth Am endm ent p rotects
p eop le,not p laces ,”the characteriz ation ofan a re a as cons titu tionally
4 1 . Olive r, 4 66 U.S.at 1 7 8 (“In as s es s ing the degree to w hich a s earch infringes
u p on indiv idu alp riv acy ,the Cou rt has giv en w eight to s u ch factors as the intention of
the Fram ers ofthe Fou rth Am endm ent,e.g.,Unite d Sta te sv.Cha d w ick,4 3 3 U.S.1 ,7 –8
(1 97 7 ),the u s es to w hich the indiv idu alhas p u t a location,e.g.,Jone sv.Unite d Sta te s,
3 62 U.S.257 ,265 (1 960), and ou r s ocietalu nders tanding that certain areas des erv e
the m os t s cru p u lou s p rotection from gov ernm ent inv as ion, e.g., Pa yton v.Ne w York,
4 4 5 U.S.57 3 (1 98 0).Thes e factors are eq u ally relev ant to determ ining w hether the
gov ernm ent’s intru s ion u p on op en fields w ithou t a w arrant or p rob ab le cau s e
v iolates reas onab le ex p ectations ofp riv acy and is therefore a s earch p ros crib ed b y
the Am endm ent.”).
4 2. Se e id .
4 3 . Id .at 1 7 7 –8 1 .
4 4 . Id .
4 5. Se e Katz v .United States , 3 8 9 U.S.3 4 7 , 3 60 (1 967 ) (H arlan, J., concu rring);
se e a lsoOlive r,4 66 U.S.at 1 7 7 ,1 8 0 .
4 6. Se e Olive r,4 66 U.S.at 1 7 9,1 8 2–8 3 (“The tes t oflegitim acy [ofp riv acy ] is not
w hether the indiv idu alchoos es to concealas s ertedly ‘p riv ate’ activ ity .Rather, the
correct inq u iry is w hether the gov ernm ent’s intru s ion infringes u p on the p ers onal
and s ocietalv alu es p rotected b y the Fou rth Am endm ent.”).
4 7 . Se e Ka tz,3 8 9 U.S.at 3 61 –62 (H arlan,J.,concu rring).
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p rotected is ins u fficient, and the focu s of the inq u iry s hou ld b e on
w hat an ind ivid ua l “s eeks to p res erv e as p riv ate, ev en in an area
acces s ib le to the p u b lic.”4 8 Ju s tice H arlan,how ev er,p ointed ou t in his
concu rrence that a p ers on’s ex p ectation of p riv acy is inex tricab ly
connected to a p lace.4 9
M ore im p ortantly , Ju s tice H arlan’s concu rrence p rov ided a
tw ofold tes t for determ ining w hich p laces m ay fallw ithin a p ers on’s
ex p ectation ofp riv acy .50 The Ka tzreas onab le-ex p ectation-of-p riv acy
tes t, s tillrelied on b y cou rts today , p erm its p riv acy to b e w arranted
w herev er “[1 .] a p ers on ha[s ] ex hib ited an actu al (s u b jectiv e)
ex p ectation ofp riv acy and, ...[2.] [w here] the ex p ectation [is ] one
that s ociety is p rep ared to recogniz e as ‘reas onab le.’”51 Es s entially ,
the tes t as ks the cou rt to “b alance a defendant’s dim inis hed p riv acy
interes t agains t the gov ernm ent’s legitim ate interes t” in needing to
condu ct a w arrantles s s earch.52
The Ka tz tes t directly lends its w ay into the holding ofOlive rv.
Unite d Sta te sregarding op en fields .53 Sp ecifically ,Olive rrelied on Ka tz
in holding that “in the cas e of op en fields , the general rights of
p rop erty p rotected b y the com m on law oftres p as s hav e little or no
relev ance to the ap p licab ility ofthe Fou rth Am endm ent,”b ecau s e the
right to ex clu de others from one’s p rop erty “v indicates no legitim ate
p riv acy interes t.”54 Thu s , “no ex p ectation of p riv acy legitim ately
attaches to op en fields .”55 Cons eq u ently ,ev idence ob tained from op en
fields ,to w hich law enforcem ent officers enjoy an eq u alright ofacces s
as the p u b lic,is not the fru it ofan u nreas onab le s earch or s eiz u re.
4 8 . Se e id .at 3 51 –52 (finding that an indiv idu alw ho enters and s hu ts the door
of a telep hone b ooth— des p ite its p u b lic natu re and v is ib ility — is cons titu tionally
“entitled to as s u m e that the w ords he u tters into the m ou thp iece w illnot b e b roadcas t
to the w orld”).
4 9. Id .at 3 61 (H arlan, J., concu rring) (“Generally , as here, the ans w er to th[e]
q u es tion [of w hat p rotection the Fou rth Am endm ent affords the p eop le] req u ires
reference to a ‘p lace.’”).
50 . Id .
51 . Id .
52. United States v .Perez , 4 4 0 F.Su p p .27 2, 27 6 (N .D.Ohio 1 97 7 ); se e a lso
United States v .Dav is ,7 8 5 F.3 d 4 98 ,51 7 –1 8 (1 1 th Cir.20 1 5) (ap p ly ing the b alancing
to hold that the defendant “had no reas onab le ex p ectation of p riv acy in b u s ines s
records m ade,kep t,and ow ned b y ”the telep hone com p any ,and the s tored telep hone
records p rodu ced in the cas e s erv ed “com p elling gov ernm entalinteres ts ”).
53 . Se e 4 66 U.S.1 7 0 ,1 8 0 –8 1 (1 98 4 ).
54 . Id .at 1 8 3 –8 4 .
55. Id .at 1 8 0 .
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C. Evolutionofthe Curtila g e Ana lysisa nd the DunnFa c tors
W hile the op en fields neighb oring a p ers on’s hom e m ay not b e
p rotected b y the Fou rth Am endm ent,one ofthe m ain b eneficiaries of
the Fou rth Am endm ent’s p rotection is a p ers on’s hou s e or area of
dw elling.This p rotection is b as ed on the age-old recognition ofand
res p ect for the reas onab le ex p ectation of p riv acy in one’s hom e.56
M oreov er,the Fou rth Am endm ent’s p rotection ap p lies w ith fu llforce
to “land im m ediately s u rrou nding and as s ociated w ith the hom e”that
the Cou rt cons iders “cu rtilage.”57 This is b ecau s e cu rtilage has b een
treated as p art of the hou s e w here there can b e a reas onab le
ex p ectation of p riv acy .58 Thu s , the notion of cu rtilage acts as a
lim itation to the op en-fields doctrine b y carv ing ou t an area ofFou rth
Am endm ent p rotection from the op en fields that are u np rotected b y
the Fou rth Am endm ent.
1. Orig insa nd Evolutionofthe Curtila g e Ana lysis
As w ith m any other as p ects of Am erican ju ris p ru dence, the
concep t of cu rtilage draw s its origins from the com m on law of
England, and w as initially ap p lied b y Am erican cou rts in the contex t
ofb u rglary s tatu tes .59 Cu rtilage fou nd its w ay into the p rotection of
56. Se e Ka tz,3 8 9 U.S.at 3 61 (H arlan,J.,concu rring) (“[A] m an’s hom e is ,for m os t
p u rp os es , a p lace w here he ex p ects p riv acy .”); Boy d v .United States , 1 1 6 U.S.61 6,
626–3 0 (1 8 8 6).
5 7 . Olive r,4 66 U.S.at 1 8 0 (“[T]he com m on law dis tingu is hed ‘op en fields ’from
the ‘cu rtilage’....The dis tinction im p lies that only the cu rtilage,not the neighb oring
op en fields , w arrants the Fou rth Am endm ent p rotections that attach to the hom e.”).
5 8 . Se e id .(“At com m on law , the cu rtilage is the area to w hich ex tends the
intim ate activ ity as s ociated w ith the ‘s anctity ofa m an’s hom e and the p riv acies of
life,’ ... and therefore has b een cons idered p art of the hom e its elf for Fou rth
Am endm ent p u rp os es .”(q u oting Boyd ,1 1 6 U.S.at 63 0 )).
59. Se e ,e .g ., United States v .Du nn, 4 8 0 U.S.294 , 3 00 (1 98 7 ) (“The cu rtilage
concep t originated at com m on law to ex tend to the area im m ediately s u rrou nding a
dw elling hou s e the s am e p rotection u nder the law ofb u rglary as w as afforded the
hou s e its elf.”);Bare v .Com m onw ealth, 94 S.E.1 68 , 1 7 2 (Va.1 91 7 ) (“In England the
cu rtilage s eem s to hav e inclu ded only the b u ildings w ithin the inner fence or y ard,
b ecau s e there,in early tim es ,for defens e,the cu s tom w as to enclos e s u ch p lace w ith
a s u b s tantialw all.In this cou ntry , how ev er, s u ch w alls or fences , in m any cas es , do
not ex is t, s o that w ith u s the cu rtilage inclu des the clu s ter ofb u ildings cons titu ting
the hab itation or dw elling p lace, w hether enclos ed w ith an inner fence or not.”);
W right v .State,7 7 S.E.657 ,65 8 (Ga.Ct.Ap p .1 91 3 ) (dis cu s s ing cu rtilage in the contex t
ofan Englis h b u rglary s tatu te and adv ocating to inclu de a hou s e’s cu rtilage w ithin the
s cop e ofGeorgia’s b u rglary s tatu te).
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the Fou rth Am endm ent throu gh Am osv.Unite d Sta te s.60 The Cou rt in
Am osgranted the defendant’s p etition to ex clu de ev idence ob tained
from “a s earch of [the] defendant’s hou s e and s tore ‘w ithin his
cu rtilage,’” b ecau s e the s earch w as “m ade u nlaw fu lly and w ithou t
w arrant ofany kind, in v iolation ofhis rights u nder the Fou rth and
Fifth Am endm ents .”61
At the tim e Am os w as decided, and u ntilthe Cou rt is s u ed its
decis ion in Olive r, the cu rtilage analy s is inclu ded only p hy s ical
s tru ctu res and not the grou nd or y ard s u rrou nding a hou s e.62
Throu gh Olive r,the Cou rt p rov ided an u p dated,m odern v ers ion ofthe
cu rtilage ru le,w hich ex p anded the Fou rth Am endm ent’s p rotection of
the cu rtilage from p hy s icals tru ctu res s u rrou nding the hou s e to the
grou nd or y ard im m ediately s u rrou nding the hou s e,regardles s ofthe
ex is tence ofp hy s icals tru ctu res on the grou nd or y ard.63 Althou gh,in
Olive r, the Cou rt dis tingu is hed the field on w hich the m ariju ana w as
grow n as an op en field,ou ts ide the cu rtilage, the Cou rt’s ex p lanation
ofcu rtilage did not s tay lim ited to p hy s icals tru ctu res ,as it rep eatedly
referred to cu rtilage as an “area,”and not m erely a s tru ctu re.64 Since
Olive r, the notion of cu rtilage has continu ed to inclu de the area
im m ediately s u rrou nding the hou s e w here a p ers on can reas onab ly
hav e an ex p ectation of p riv acy u nder Ka tz’s tw ofold reas onab le-
ex p ectation-of-p riv acy s tandard.65
60 . 255 U.S.3 1 3 ,3 1 4 (1 921 ).
61 . Id .
62. Brendan Peters , N ote, Fourth Am e nd m e ntYa rd W ork:Curtila g e ’sM ow -Line
Rule , 56 STAN .L.REV.94 3 ,954 –5 5 (20 04 ) (p rov iding as ex am p les ofSu p rem e Cou rt
cas es b etw een Am osand Olive r:Olm s tead v .United States ,27 7 U.S.4 3 8 ,4 66 (1 928 );
Scher v .United States ,3 05 U.S.251 ,255 (1 93 8 );Trap p er v .N orth Carolina, 4 51 U.S.
997 ,999 (1 98 1 )).
63 . Se e Olive r,4 66 U.S.at 1 8 0 ,1 8 3 –8 4 .
64 . Id .; se e a lso Peters , supra note 62, at 956 (“The Cou rt’s m ention of the
cu rtilage u nder Oliv er’s facts s u gges ts that had the m ariju ana b een grow ing in the
hou s e’s cu rtilage (law n), the w arrantles s s earch w ou ld hav e v iolated the Fou rth
Am endm ent and the ev idence w ou ld hav e b een s u p p res s ed.”).
65. Se e ,e .g ., Dow Chem icalCo.v .United States , 4 7 6 U.S.227 , 23 5 (1 98 6) (“The
cu rtilage area im m ediately s u rrou nding a p riv ate hou s e has long b een giv en
p rotection as a p lace w here the occu p ants hav e a reas onab le and legitim ate
ex p ectation ofp riv acy that s ociety is p rep ared to accep t.”);United States v .Karo,4 68
U.S.7 0 5, 7 1 5 (1 98 4 ) (finding that b ecau s e an electronic b eep er tracked inform ation
that the gov ernm ent “cou ld not hav e ob tained b y ob s erv ation from ou ts ide the
cu rtilage ofthe hou s e,” the inform ation from the b eep er w as ob tained throu gh an
u nreas onab le s earch).
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2. United States v .Du nn a nd the Du nn Fa c tors
Althou gh the Cou rt in Olive ranticip ated the cu rtilage analy s is to
b e fairly s traightforw ard “for m os t hom es ,”66 as m ore and m ore cas es
concerning cu rtilage ap p eared w ithin the Cou rt’s dom inion, the
cu rtilage inq u iry — es p ecially regarding the p hy s icalb ou ndaries and
s cop e ofthe cu rtilage— inev itab ly b ecam e m ore com p licated.67 W hen
the b ou ndaries ofcu rtilage w ere not as clearly m arked as the Olive r
Cou rt had s u p p os ed,the ex tent-of-cu rtilage inq u iry relied on the Ka tz
reas onab le-ex p ectation-of-p riv acy tes t.68 UntilUnite d Sta te sv.Dunn
in 1 98 7 , the Cou rt’s analy s is ofw here reas onab le p riv acy ex is ted for
cu rtilage p u rp os es w as lim ited to the Ka tzreas onab le-ex p ectation-of-
p riv acy tes t and the op en-fields doctrine.69
W hile Dunn delineated w hat is not cons idered cu rtilage, it als o
laid ou t the fou r factors that cou rts u s e to determ ine the cu rtilage ofa
hou s e.7 0 The fou r Dunnfactors are:
[1 .] the p rox im ity ofthe area claim ed to b e cu rtilage to the
hom e,[2.] w hether the area is inclu ded w ithin an enclos u re
s u rrou nding the hom e, [3 .] the natu re ofthe u s es to w hich
the area is p u t, and [4 .] the s tep s taken b y the res ident to
p rotect the area from ob s erv ation b y p eop le p as s ing b y .7 1
66. Se e Olive r, 4 66 U.S.at 1 8 2 n.1 2 (“[F]or m os t hom es , the b ou ndaries ofthe
cu rtilage w illb e clearly m arked; and the concep tion defining the cu rtilage— as the
area arou nd the hom e to w hich the activ ity ofhom e life ex tends — is a fam iliar one
eas ily u nders tood from ou r daily ex p erience.The occas ionaldifficu lties that cou rts
m ight hav e in ap p ly ing this , like other, legal concep ts , do not argu e for the
u np recedented ex p ans ion ofthe Fou rth Am endm ent [to op en fields as ] adv ocated b y
the dis s ent.”).
67 . Se e Peters , supra note 62, at 94 5 (“[T]he cu rtilage’s b ou ndary w as not as
clearly m arked as the Cou rt thou ght.”).
68 . Se e California v .Ciraolo, 4 7 6 U.S.20 7 , 21 1 –1 4 (1 98 6) (ap p ly ing the Ka tz
reas onab le-ex p ectation-of-p riv acy tes t to hold that defendant’s “ex p ectation that his
[m ariju ana] garden [w ithin the p hy s icalcu rtilage ofhis hom e] w as p rotected from
s u ch ob s erv ation [b y the p olice from p u b lic airs p ace] is u nreas onab le and is not an
ex p ectation that s ociety is p rep ared to honor”);se e a lsoCalifornia v .Rooney ,4 8 3 U.S.
3 0 7 , 3 1 9–26 (1 98 7 ) (holding that defendant’s tras hcan, althou gh p hy s ically w ithin
the cu rtilage ofhis hom e, did not fallw ithin the cu rtilage b ecau s e defendant had no
reas onab le ex p ectation ofp riv acy in his tras hcan);supra note 66.
69. Se e United States v .Du nn,4 8 0 U.S.294 ,3 01 (1 98 7 ) (holding that the Fou rth
Am endm ent p rotections afforded to defendant’s hou s e cou ld not b e ex p anded to
inclu de the area s u rrou nding the b arn b ecau s e the area s u rrou nding the b arn did not
lie w ithin the cu rtilage ofdefendant’s ranch hou s e).
7 0 . Se e id .
7 1 . Id .
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Together, thes e fou r factors p os e the centralq u es tion for any
cu rtilage determ ination: “w hether the area in q u es tion is s o
intim ately tied to the hom e its elfthat it s hou ld b e p laced u nder the
hom e’s ‘u m b rella’ofFou rth Am endm ent p rotection.”7 2
W hereas the Olive r Cou rt p res crib ed agains t a cas e-b y -cas e
analy s is ofthe cu rtilage inq u iry ,the DunnCou rt ex p res s ly adv ocated
for s u ch an analy s is .7 3 In Dunn,the Cou rt cons idered the ty p icalu s e of
a b arn.7 4 The Cou rt had tw o op tions :follow Olive rand refu s e to do a
cas e-b y -cas e analy s is b y adop ting the generalru le that a b arn is in
dom es ticu s e,7 5 or p erform a cas e-s p ecificanaly s is and determ ine that
the b arn-in-q u es tion w as “not b eing u s ed for intim ate activ ities ofthe
hom e,”and hence w as not in the cu rtilage.7 6 Des p ite Ju s tice Brennan’s
dis s enting argu m ent, the m ajority in Dunn chos e the latter, cas e-b y -
cas e analy s is .7 7 Cons eq u ently , the Cou rt declined to adop t a b right-
line ru le lim iting the b ou ndaries of cu rtilage to “ex tend no farther
than the neares t fence s u rrou nding a fenced hou s e” and reiterated
that “the p rim ary focu s [s hou ld b e] w hether the area in q u es tion
harb ors thos e intim ate activ ities as s ociated w ith dom es ticlife and the
p riv acies ofthe hom e.”7 8
Since Dunn, the notion ofcu rtilage has continu ed to ev olv e and
has ev en gained a v erticaldim ens ion w here gov ernm ent s u rv eillance
from airs p ace has b een q u es tioned as an u nreas onab le intru s ion into
p riv acy p rotected b y the Fou rth Am endm ent.7 9 Ins tead ofap p ly ing
7 2. Id .
7 3 . Se e id .at 3 1 0 –1 2 (Brennan,J.,dis s enting).
7 4 . Se e id .at 3 02–0 3 .
7 5. Id .at 3 1 0 (Brennan,J.,dis s enting).
7 6. Id .at 3 0 2–03 .
7 7 . Se e id .at 3 02–0 3 ;id .at 3 1 0 –1 2 (Brennan,J.,dis s enting).
7 8 . Id .at 3 01 n.4 (“Ap p lication ofthe Gov ernm ent’s ‘firs t fence ru le’m ight w ell
lead to dim inis hed Fou rth Am endm ent p rotection in thos e cas es w here a s tru ctu re
ly ing ou ts ide a hom e’s enclos ing fence w as u s ed for s u ch dom es tic activ ities .And,in
thos e cas es w here a hou s e is s itu ated on a large p arcelofp rop erty and has no nearb y
enclos ing fence, the Gov ernm ent’s ru le w ou ld s erv e no u tility ;a cou rt w ou ld s tillb e
req u ired to as s es s the v ariou s factors ou tlined ab ov e to define the ex tent of the
cu rtilage.”).
7 9. Se e Florida v .Riley ,4 8 8 U.S.4 4 5,4 4 7 –4 8 (1 98 9) (holding that “s u rv eillance
ofthe interior ofa p artially cov ered greenhou s e in a res identialb acky ard from the
v antage p oint of a helicop ter located 4 0 0 feet ab ov e the greenhou s e” does not
cons titu te “a ‘s earch’for w hich a w arrant is req u ired u nder the Fou rth Am endm ent”);
se e a lso California v . Ciraolo, 4 7 6 U.S. 20 7 , 21 1 –1 4 (1 98 6) (holding that the
w arrantles s aerial ob s erv ation of a b acky ard, w ithin cu rtilage, w as not a Fou rth
Am endm ent v iolation).
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the Dunn factors , w hich are m ore s u ited for the horiz ontal, grou nd
cu rtilage inq u iry , the Cou rt, once again, fou nd Ka tz’s reas onab le-
ex p ectation-of-p riv acy tes t to lend the neces s ary gu idance.8 0 The tw o
m ajor U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt cas es in the area of v erticalcu rtilage—
Florid a v.Rile yand Ca lifornia v.Cira olo— agreed that the defendants
s atis fied the firs t p rong ofthe Ka tz tes t b y es tab lis hing a s u b jectiv e
ex p ectation ofp riv acy in the areas s u rv eilled b u t had failed to s how
the s econd p rong that “s u ch an ex p ectation [of p riv acy ] w as . . .
reas onab le and ...one that ‘s ociety is p rep ared to honor.’”8 1
D. Inte rpre ta tionofCurtila g e inM inne sota
M innes ota acknow ledges that the op en-fields doctrine allow s
gov ernm ent officials to acces s any location that is not s om eone’s
p riv ate hom e or the hom e’s cu rtilage.8 2 M innes ota has als o adop ted
the Dunn factors to determ ine w hich areas s u rrou nding a hom e fall
w ithin the cu rtilage.8 3 Before the U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt decided Dunn,
the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt u s ed the op en-fields analy s is and the
Ka tz reas onab le-ex p ectation-of-p riv acy tes t to hold that areas
s u rrou nding a hou s e that are im p liedly op en to the p u b lic,s u ch as an
op en driv ew ay ,do not fallw ithin the cu rtilage ofthe hou s e.8 4 W ith the
em ergence ofthe Dunnfactors and p rior cas es dealing w ith cu rtilage,
the general interp retation of cu rtilage in M innes ota has rev olv ed
arou nd the determ ination of w hether p olice officers “res trict their
m ov em ents to p laces v is itors cou ld b e ex p ected to go (e.g., w alkw ay s ,
8 0 . Se e Rile y,4 8 8 U.S.4 4 5 at 4 4 9;Cira olo,4 7 6 U.S.at 21 4 .
8 1 . Rile y,4 8 8 U.S.4 4 5 at 4 4 9 (q u oting Cira olo,4 7 6 U.S.at 21 4 ).
8 2. State v .Sorens on,4 4 1 N .W .2d 4 55 ,4 60 (M inn.1 98 9) (“The term ‘op en field’
has b een cons tru ed to ap p ly not only to an op en field in a literals ens e, b u t als o to
w ooded areas ,des erts ,v acant lots in u rb an areas ,op en b eaches ,res erv oirs and op en
w aters .This b road definition, along w ith the ex p ans ion of the doctrine in Olive r,
ap p ears to p erm it gov ernm ent intru s ion any w here ex cep t hom es , the cu rtilage of
hom es and other areas in w hich a reas onab le ex p ectation ofp riv acy can b e p rov en.”
(citation om itted)).
8 3 . Se e State v .Chu te, 908 N .W .2d 57 8 , 5 8 4 (M inn.20 1 8 );State v .Carter, 569
N .W .2d 1 69,1 7 7 (M inn.1 997 );Sore nson,4 4 1 N .W .2d at 4 58 .Se e g e ne ra lly4 2 DUN N ELL
M IN N .DIG.,Se a rch a nd Se izure § 1 .0 1 (20 1 7 ).
8 4 . Se e United States v .Du nn, 4 8 0 U.S.294 , 3 0 1 (1 98 7 );Katz v .United States ,
3 8 9 U.S.3 4 7 ,3 61 (1 967 );State v .Crea,3 05 M inn.3 4 2,3 4 5–4 7 ,23 3 N .W .2d 7 3 6,7 3 9–
4 0 (1 97 5) (holding p olice intru s ion onto an op en driv ew ay to ex am ine the “trailers
w hich w ere in p lain s ight”w as not an intru s ion into the hom e’s cu rtilage).
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driv ew ay s , p orches ).”8 5 Thu s , in M innes ota, op en driv ew ay s ,8 6
hallw ay s ou ts ide ap artm ent u nits w here the landlord has giv en acces s
to law enforcem ent,8 7 and w alkw ay s and p orches w here v is itors are
ex p ected to roam 8 8 are reas onab le p laces for law enforcem ent to
condu ct a s earch,regardles s ofw hether they fallw ithin the definition
ofcu rtilage.
III. T H E CH UTEDECISION
A. Fa c tsa nd Proc e d ura lPosture
On Octob er 22, 201 1 , from Cou nty Road D in M ap lew ood,
M innes ota, B.F. noticed his s tolen cam p er p arked on Defendant
Qu entin Chu te’s dirt driv ew ay .8 9 B.F.had rep orted his cam p er s tolen
in Ju ly 201 1 .90 After s p otting the cam p er on Chu te’s driv ew ay , B.F.
m ade a U-tu rn on Cou nty Road D s o that he cou ld get another look at
the cam p er and v erify it as his .91 H av ing reas onab ly conv inced him s elf
that it w as indeed his cam p er on the driv ew ay , B.F.then notified the
p olice ofhis dis cov ery .92 An officer joined B.F.at the end ofChu te’s
8 5. State v .Krech,4 03 N .W .2d 63 4 ,63 7 (M inn.1 98 7 ) (citation om itted) (holding
that the p olice did not v iolate defendant’s Fou rth Am endm ent rights in entering his
land to s eiz e the ab andoned p rop erty in garb age b ecau s e defendant did not hav e a
reas onab le,or ev en an actu al,ex p ectation that the area w here the garb age cans w ere
located w ou ld b e treated as p rotected u nder the Fou rth Am endm ent).Se e g e ne ra lly
Dunn,4 8 0 U.S.294 ;Cre a ,3 05 M inn.3 4 2,23 3 N .W .2d 7 3 6.
8 6. Cre a ,3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 6,23 3 N .W .2d at 7 3 9.
8 7 . State v . Eds trom , 91 6 N .W .2d 51 2, 520 –21 (M inn. 20 1 8 ) (holding that
b ecau s e the p olice had the landlord’s p erm is s ion to b e in the hallw ay ofdefendant’s
ap artm ent u nit, and b ecau s e there w as a reas onab le s u s p icion ofcrim inalactiv ity
w here defendant had no reas onab le ex p ectation ofp riv acy , the dog-s niffcondu cted
b y the p olice in the hallw ay did not cons titu te a s earch w ithin the m eaning ofthe
Fou rth Am endm ent).
8 8 . Kre ch,4 0 3 N .W .2d at 63 7 (conclu ding that the defendant had no reas onab le
ex p ectation ofp riv acy in the garb age b ags and the dis carded s hip p ing b ox that he had
ab andoned, ev en thou gh they w ere in areas ofdefendant’s res idence w here he m ay
not hav e granted p erm is s ion for the p u b lic to b e).“[P]olice do not need a w arrant or
ev en p rob ab le cau s e to ap p roach a dw elling in order to condu ct an inv es tigation if
they res trict their m ov em ents to p laces v is itors cou ld b e ex p ected to go (e.g.,
w alkw ay s ,driv ew ay s ,p orches ).”Id .(internalq u otation m arks om itted).
8 9. State v .Chu te,8 8 7 N .W .2d 8 3 4 ,8 3 9 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .20 1 6),a ff’d ,90 8 N .W .2d
57 8 (M inn.20 1 8 ).
90 . Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 1 .
91 . Id .
92. Id .
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dirt driv ew ay and confirm ed, w hile s tanding on Cou nty Road D, that
the cam p er w as ofthe s am e m ake and m odelas that ofthe cam p er
rep orted s tolen b y B.F.93
After B.F.told the officer ab ou t the u niq u e s et ofb olts B.F.had
ins talled on the cam p er, w hich had initially help ed him identify the
cam p er as his , the officer w anted to affirm ativ ely ens u re that the
cam p er on Chu te’s dirt driv ew ay did in fact b elong to B.F.94
Accordingly , b oth the officer and B.F.w alked dow n the dirt driv ew ay
tow ard the cam p er.95 Althou gh the cam p er’s licens e p late and v ehicle
identification nu m b er (VIN ) had b een rem ov ed, the officer w as ab le
to identify a p artial VIN on the cam p er after s p eaking to the
m anu factu rer ofthe cam p er ov er the p hone.The p artialVIN ofthe
cam p er on the driv ew ay m atched that ofB.F.’s s tolen cam p er.96 At
that p oint,the officer entered the cam p er to find B.F.’s p ers onalitem s
ins ide.97
W ith the foregoing dis cov ery , the officer s tarted w alking on the
driv ew ay to ap p roach the b ack of Chu te’s hom e and ev entu ally
knocked on Chu te’s garage in the b acky ard.98 Chu te ans w ered to
inform the officer that he had b een s toring the cam p er for a friend.99
After noticing s om e m ore p ers onal p rop erty from the cam p er in
Chu te’s garage, the officer as ked to s earch the p rop erty , and Chu te
cons ented to the s earch of his hom e and garage after s om e
dis cu s s ion.1 00 The s earch rev ealed ev en m ore s tolen p rop erty from
the cam p er on Chu te’s p rop erty .1 01
Pu rs u ant to s ection 609.53 , s u b div is ion 1 , and s ection 609.52,
s u b div is ion 3 (3 )(a),ofthe M innes ota Statu tes ,the State ofM innes ota
charged Chu te w ith receiv ing and p os s es s ing s tolen p rop erty .1 02
Claim ing that the officer’s p res ence on his p rop erty cons titu ted an
“u nlaw fu ls earch,” Chu te m ov ed to s u p p res s allev idence from the
s earch,p u rs u ant to the ex clu s ionary ru le.1 03 The dis trict cou rt denied
the m otion,holding that the officer “had a law fu lright ofacces s to the
93 . Id .
94 . Id .
95. Id .
96. Id .
97 . Id .
98 . Id .
99. Chute ,8 8 7 N .W .2d at 8 3 9.
1 0 0 . Id .
1 0 1 . Id .
1 0 2. Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 2.
1 0 3 . Chute ,8 8 7 N .W .2d at 8 4 3 .
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cam p er”b ecau s e the driv ew ay w as “im p liedly op en to the p u b lic.”1 04
Cons eq u ently , the dis trict cou rt refu s ed to s u p p res s the ev idence
fou nd from the officer’s p res ence on Chu te’s driv ew ay and conv icted
Chu te ofthe charges b rou ght agains t him .1 05
The M innes ota Cou rt ofAp p eals , how ev er, rev ers ed the dis trict
cou rt’s denial of Chu te’s m otion to s u p p res s .1 06 The M innes ota
Su p rem e Cou rt affirm ed, holding the officer’s entry into Chu te’s
driv ew ay ,for the p u rp os e ofex am ining the cam p er,to b e ou ts ide the
s cop e of the im p lied licens e to the driv ew ay that Chu te m ay hav e
granted to the p u b lic.1 0 7 On that b as is , the cou rt fou nd the officer’s
condu ct cons titu ted a tres p as s ory s earch, w hich als o tainted Chu te’s
later cons ent to a s earch ofhis garage and hou s e.1 0 8 The M innes ota
Su p rem e Cou rt granted Chu te’s m otion to s u p p res s the ev idence
ob tained from his driv ew ay and v acated his conv iction for lack of
ev idence.1 09
B. The M inne sota Supre m e Court’sDe c ision
To arriv e at its conclu s ion that the officer had condu cted an
u nlaw fu ls earch on Chu te’s p rop erty , the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt
firs t had to decide w hether the officer’s condu ct cons titu ted a “s earch”
u nder the Fou rth Am endm ent.The cou rt conclu ded that the officer
p erform ed a s earch on Chu te’s p rop erty b ecau s e the officer w as
“tres p as s ing u p on one of the kinds of p rop erty enu m erated in the
Fou rth Am endm ent;” s p ecifically , he w as tres p as s ing u p on Chu te’s
hou s e.1 1 0 Becau s e it w as a s earch u nder the Fou rth Am endm ent, the
officer needed a w arrant to b e on Chu te’s p rop erty , u nles s an
ex cep tion, like the knock-and-talk ex cep tion,1 1 1 to the req u irem ent
for a w arrant ap p lied.1 1 2
The cou rt ap p lied the fou r Dunnfactors to hold that the driv ew ay ,
w here the officer w as alleged to hav e condu cted his s earch, w as
1 0 4 . Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 2.
1 0 5. Id .
1 0 6. Chute ,8 8 7 N .W .2d at 8 4 7 .
1 0 7 . Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 8 .
1 0 8 . Id .
1 0 9. Id .
1 1 0 . Id .at 58 3 (citing United States v .Jones ,565 U.S.4 00 ,4 0 4 –05,4 1 1 (20 1 2)).
1 1 1 . The knock-and-talk ex cep tion inv olv es “knocking on the door and s eeking to
s p eak to an occu p ant for the p u rp os e of gathering ev idence.” Id .(citing Florida v .
Jardines ,569 U.S.1 ,21 (201 3 )).
1 1 2. Id .
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w ithin the cu rtilage ofChu te’s hom e w herein Chu te had a reas onab le
ex p ectation ofp riv acy to not b e s u b ject to a w arrantles s s earch.1 1 3
H ow ev er, b ecau s e Chu te had im p liedly allow ed the p u b lic to u s e his
driv ew ay to acces s the b ack entrance ofhis hou s e, the officer had an
im p lied licens e to b e on the driv ew ay .1 1 4 N ev ertheles s ,the cou rt held
that the s cop e of the officer’s im p lied licens e w as lim ited to the
s p ecific p u rp os e of acces s ing the b ack entrance.1 1 5 Althou gh the
officer had the right to b e on Chu te’s driv ew ay to acces s the b ack
entrance,w ithou t the req u is ite w arrant,he did not hav e the licens e to
inv es tigate the cam p er on the driv ew ay .1 1 6
M oreov er,the cou rt fou nd that the knock-and-talk ex cep tion to a
w arrantles s s earch did not ap p ly b ecau s e the officer did not enter
Chu te’s driv ew ay w ith the narrow intention ofknocking on Chu te’s
door to ob tain his cons ent to a s earch.1 1 7 Allofthis led the cou rt to
conclu de that the ev idence ob tained from the officer’s inv es tigation of
the cam p er on Chu te’s p rop erty , and all other foregoing findings ,
s hou ld b e s u p p res s ed as called for b y the ex clu s ionary ru le.1 1 8
IV. AN ALYSIS
A. Chu te Erre d inApplying the Sc ope ofthe Im plie d Pub lic Lic e nse
The m ajority in Chute erred b y holding that the officer’s s earch of
the cam p er on Chu te’s driv ew ay w as u nreas onab le b ecau s e the officer
had ex ceeded the s cop e of the im p lied licens e to b e on the
driv ew ay .1 1 9 The m ajority s hou ld hav e fou nd that b ecau s e the officer
had an im p lied licens e to b e on Chu te’s driv ew ay and had a s trong,
p rior indication that the cam p er on the driv ew ay b elonged to B.F.
(from the officer’s ob s erv ation and B.F.’s des crip tion of the s tolen
cam p er), u nder Sta te v.Cre a and s u b s eq u ent M innes ota p recedent,
the officer had the right to ex am ine the cam p er on the driv ew ay to
m ake s u re it w as indeed the one s tolen from B.F.1 20
1 1 3 . Id .at 58 3 –8 5.
1 1 4 . Id .at 58 6–8 8 .
1 1 5. Id .
1 1 6. Id .
1 1 7 . Id .at 58 6–8 7 .
1 1 8 . Se e id .at 5 8 8 .
1 1 9. Se e id .
1 20 . Se e State v .Crea,3 05 M inn.3 4 2,3 4 6,23 3 N .W .2d 7 3 6,7 3 9–4 0 (1 97 5) (“The
p olice had a right to w alk onto the driv ew ay b ecau s e it w as an area ofthe cu rtilage
im p liedly op en to u s e b y the p u b lic.They w ou ld hav e had to w alk on it in order to get
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1. The M e a ning a nd Sc ope ofthe Im plie d Pub lic Lic e nse to
Curtila g e
Am erican s ocialnorm s hav e long im p lied that the ow ner of a
hou s e giv es p erm is s ion to the p u b lic to acces s the area leading u p to
the hou s e for the p u rp os e ofknocking on the door and s eeking the
res idents .1 21 Sp atially , this im p licit licens e m ay ex tend to the
p orch,1 22 an op en garage,1 23 the driv ew ay leading u p to the hom e’s
entrance,1 24 and p arts ofthe cu rtilage that p rov ide a p athw ay to the
hou s e.Ju s t as m em b ers ofthe p u b lichav e an im p lied licens e to acces s
thes e lim ited p arts of the cu rtilage, s o do p olice officers w ithou t
w arrants .1 25
In addition to the s p atialb ou ndaries ofthe im p lied p u b liclicens e,
there als o is a p u rp os e-lim itation to the s cop e ofthe im p lied p u b lic
licens e to a hom e’s cu rtilage.1 26 The s ocially accep tab le p u rp os e for
ex ercis ing the im p lied p u b lic licens e is to gain a p athw ay to the
entrance ofthe hou s e from w here the licens ee can knock to ob tain
fu rther acces s into the hou s e.1 27 This is cons is tent w ith the general
notion ofa licens e— a licens e ob tained for a s p ecific p u rp os e cannot
b e ex tended to p u rp os es ou ts ide the s cop e ofthe licens e.For ex am p le,
ifan ow ner giv es s om eone a licens e to clean the b as em ent ofa hou s e,
ru m m aging throu gh the b ox es in the b as em ent w ou ld b e b ey ond the
s cop e ofthe licens e, and hence, u nlaw fu l.Ap p lied to a p olice officer,
the im p lied p u b lic licens e giv es an officer the p erm is s ion to acces s a
hom e’s cu rtilage to “ap p roach a hom e, knock on the front door, and
to the hou s e s o that they cou ld knock on the door to talk w ith defendant.Thu s , they
had a right to b e in the p lace from w hich they v iew ed the firs t trailer.H av ing v iew ed
the trailer in p lain s ight, they had a right to ex am ine it to determ ine w hether it w as
the s tolen trailer.”).
1 21 . Florida v .Jardines ,5 69 U.S.1 ,8 (20 1 3 ) (“A licens e m ay b e im p lied from the
hab its ofthe cou ntry ....”(q u oting M cKee v .Gratz ,260 U.S.1 27 ,1 3 6 (1 922)));United
States v .H olm es , 1 4 3 F.Su p p . 3 d 1 25 2, 1 258 (M .D.Fla.201 5) (“In Am erica, an
‘im p licit licens e ty p ically p erm its the v is itor to ap p roach the hom e b y the front p ath,
knock p rom p tly , w ait b riefly to b e receiv ed, and then (ab s ent inv itation to linger
longer) leav e.’”(q u oting Ja rd ine s,5 69 U.S.at 8 )).
1 22. Se e H olm e s,1 4 3 F.Su p p .3 d at 1 260 .
1 23 . Se e Tracht v .Com m ’r ofPu b .Safety ,592 N .W .2d 8 63 ,8 64 –65 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .
1 999).
1 24 . Se e Cre a ,3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 6,23 3 N .W .2d at 7 3 9–4 0 .
1 25. Se e Ja rd ine s,569 U.S.at 8 .
1 26. Se e id .at 9 (“The s cop e ofa licens e— ex p res s or im p lied— is lim ited not only
to a p articu lar area b u t als o to a s p ecificp u rp os e.”).
1 27 . Id .
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as k to s p eak w ith the occu p ants .”1 28 This right of the p olice is
com m only know n as the knock-and-talk ex cep tion to the req u irem ent
for a s earch w arrant.1 29
The U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt, in Florid a v.Ja rd ine s, ru led that the
im p lied licens e to ap p roach a hom e to knock on its door does not
allow a p olice officer to condu ct a s earch ofthe hom e, ev en from the
ou ts ide area, w hich the officer has an im p lied licens e to acces s .1 3 0 In
Ja rd ine s, the officer arriv ed on the defendant’s p orch, w here he w as
p hy s ically allow ed to b e u nder the im p lied licens e.1 3 1 The officer,
how ev er, w as not on the p orch for a knock-and-talk.1 3 2 Rather, his
p u rp os e w as to condu ct a s earch of w hat w as going on ins ide
defendant’s hom e, from the p orch, w ith the aid of a dru g-s niffing
dog.1 3 3 In determ ining w hether the officer ex ercis ed his im p lied
p u b lic licens e to the hom e’s cu rtilage for the im p erm is s ib le p u rp os e
ofcondu cting a s earch, the Cou rt noted that “the s u b jectiv e intent of
the officer is irrelev ant.”1 3 4 If the officer’s “b ehav ior ob jectiv ely
rev eals a p u rp os e to condu ct a s earch, w hich is not w hat any one
w ou ld think he had licens e to do,” then the officer’s p res ence and
condu ct on the cu rtilage ex ceeds the s cop e ofthe im p lied licens e.1 3 5
In M innes ota, “p olice w ith legitim ate b u s ines s m ay enter areas
w ithin the cu rtilage ofthe hom e ifthos e areas are im p liedly op en to
the p u b lic.”1 3 6 The p erm is s ib le p u rp os e of the p olice’s entry , in
M innes ota, is m os tly congru ent w ith that from Ja rd ine s.The p olice
m ay , w ithou t a w arrant,enter the cu rtilage to ap p roach the hom e and
condu ct a knock-and-talk to q u es tion the hom eow ner.1 3 7 The only
difference is that in M innes ota, u nder Sta te v.Cre a ,p olice officers are
ex p res s ly p erm itted to “keep their ey es op en and u s e their other
s ens es ”w hile ex ercis ing their im p lied licens e to b e on the cu rtilage.1 3 8
1 28 . United States v .Carlos s , 8 1 8 F.3 d 98 8 ,990 (1 0 th Cir.201 6).
1 29. Se e State v .Chu te,90 8 N .W .2d 57 8 ,5 8 1 n.1 (M inn.201 8 ).
1 3 0 . 569 U.S.at 9–1 0 .
1 3 1 . Id .at 3 .
1 3 2. Id .at 3 –4 .
1 3 3 . Id .at 8 –9.
1 3 4 . Id .at 1 0 (citing As hcroft v .al-Kidd, 563 U.S.7 3 1 (20 1 1 ); W hren v .United
States ,51 7 U.S.8 06 (1 996)).
1 3 5. Id .
1 3 6. State v .Chu te, 8 8 7 N .W .2d 8 3 4 , 8 4 1 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .201 6) (citing State v .
Crea,3 0 5 M inn.3 4 2,3 4 6,23 3 N .W .2d 7 3 6,7 3 9 (1 97 5)),a ff’d ,90 8 N .W .2d 57 8 (M inn.
20 1 8 ).
1 3 7 . Se e id .at 8 4 0 .
1 3 8 . Se e Cre a ,3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 6,23 3 N .W .2d at 7 3 9.
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Cre a ’s holding, that p olice officers “in s u ch a s itu ation ...are free to
keep their ey es op en and u s e their other s ens es ,”1 3 9 is long-s tanding
and finds its w ay into recent M innes ota cas es ,inclu ding Chute .1 4 0
2. Chu te Like lyDid NotH a ve toFollow Jardines
The Chute cou rt correctly held that b ecau s e the driv ew ay
p rov ided acces s to the hou s e’s b ack door, Chu te had giv en the p u b lic
an im p lied acces s to his driv ew ay .1 4 1 Under b oth federaland s tate law ,
this im p lied p u b lic licens e als o p rov ided the officer w ith a licens e to
b e on the driv ew ay .1 4 2 The M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt relied on
Florid a v.Ja rd ine s to determ ine that an officer is lim ited b y the
p u rp os e of an im p lied licens e w hen he enters the cu rtilage of a
hom e.1 4 3 The cou rt, how ev er, erred in holding that the s cop e ofthe
licens e’s p u rp os e, as it ap p lied to the officer in the ins tant cas e, w as
lim ited to only u s ing the driv ew ay to acces s the b ack door to s eek
Chu te for fu rther inv es tigation.1 4 4 Sp ecifically , the cou rt fou nd that
the officer u tiliz ed his im p lied licens e for an im p rop er p u rp os e
b ecau s e the officer did not enter the driv ew ay for the s ole p u rp os e of
reaching the b ack door and had,ins tead,ex am ined the cam p er on the
driv ew ay b efore knocking on Chu te’s door.1 4 5
The M innes ota Cou rt ofAp p eals ju s tified its decis ion1 4 6 to follow
Ja rd ine s b y citing to the b inding natu re of U.S. “Su p rem e Cou rt
p recedent on m atters offederallaw ,inclu ding the interp retation and
1 3 9. Id .
1 4 0 . Se e ,e .g .,Chute ,8 8 7 N .W .2d at 8 4 1 ;State v .Kronz er,N o.A1 2-04 0 0 ,201 2 W L
6652596,at *2 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .Dec.24 ,201 2);State v .H op kins ,N o.C9-0 2-1 3 3 4 ,200 3
W L3 4 7 5 7 4 ,at *1 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .Feb .1 8 ,20 03 ).
1 4 1 . Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 6 (citing State v .Jenkins ,7 8 2 N .W .2d 21 1 ,223 (M inn.
20 1 0 )) (“Becau s e the dis trict cou rt’s finding that Chu te granted the p u b lican im p lied
licens e to acces s his land b y u s ing this dirt driv ew ay is s u p p orted b y the record,it is
not clearly erroneou s .”).
1 4 2. Se e id .
1 4 3 . Id .(“The s cop e ofthe im p lied licens e ‘is lim ited not only to a p articu lar area
b u t als o to a s p ecificp u rp os e.’”(q u oting Florida v .Jardines ,569 U.S.1 ,9 (20 1 3 )).
1 4 4 . Se e id .at 5 8 6–8 7 (“Bas ed on the ev idence, w e conclu de that the officer’s
intru s ion v iolated the lim itations ofthe im p lied licens e to enter Chu te’s p rop erty .”).
1 4 5. Se e id .at 5 8 7 (“Any one ob s erv ing the officer’s actions ob jectiv ely w ou ld
conclu de that his p u rp os e w as not to q u es tion the res ident ofthe hou s e,b u t to ins p ect
the cam p er, ‘w hich is not w hat any one w ou ld think he had licens e to do.’” (q u oting
Ja rd ine s,569 U.S.at 1 0)).
1 4 6. State v .Chu te, 8 8 7 N .W .2d 8 3 4 , 8 4 1 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .20 1 6) (q u oting State v .
Bris t,8 1 2 N .W .2d 51 ,54 (M inn.20 1 2)),a ff’d ,90 8 N .W .2d 5 7 8 (M inn.201 8 ).
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ap p lication of the United States Cons titu tion,” as long as the U.S.
Su p rem e Cou rt ru lings are “on p oint.”1 4 7 By affirm ing the M innes ota
Cou rt of Ap p eals and fu rther ap p ly ing Ja rd ine s, the M innes ota
Su p rem e Cou rt chos e to follow Ja rd ine s ov er M innes ota’s ow n
p recedent.1 4 8 This ap p roach ofthe M innes ota cou rts to follow the U.S.
Su p rem e Cou rt’s p recedent w hen it com es to concerns u nder the
Cons titu tion s eem s p ru dent on its face. After all, the Su p rem acy
Clau s e ofthe Cons titu tion, in conju nction w ith M a rb ury v.M a d ison,
v es ts in the U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt the right to interp ret the Cons titu tion
and b ind the s tate cou rts accordingly .1 4 9 Becau s e the notion of
s u p p res s ing ev idence ob tained throu gh u nreas onab le s earches
originates from the ex clu s ionary ru le,1 50 w hich v indicates a crim inal
defendant’s Fou rth Am endm ent rights ,it w ou ld s eem ap t to follow the
U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt on m atters related to the ex clu s ionary ru le.
M os t recently ,how ev er,the U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt,and s p ecifically
Ju s tice Thom as ,in Collinsv.Virg inia ,called into q u es tion the “Cou rt’s
au thority to im p os e [the ex clu s ionary ]ru le on the States .”1 51 Althou gh
Ju s tice Thom as agreed w ith the m ajority ’s holding that the
au tom ob ile ex cep tion to a w arrantles s s earch does not ap p ly w hen
the v ehicle is w ithin the cu rtilage,1 52 he noted that the ex clu s ionary
ru le “is not ‘a p ers onal cons titu tional right.’”1 53 Ju s tice Thom as
ex p lained that “the ex clu s ionary ru le is a ‘ju dicially created’doctrine
1 4 7 . Brist, 8 1 2 N .W .2d at 54 (citations om itted) (“W e hav e therefore recogniz ed
that, w hen w e cons ider m atters aris ing u nder the United States Cons titu tion, w e are
b ou nd to ap p ly Su p rem e Cou rt decis ions that are on p oint and are good law .”).
1 4 8 . Se e dis cu s s ion infra Section IV.B.
1 4 9. Se e U.S.CON ST.art.VI,cl.2;M arb u ry v .M adis on,5 U.S.1 3 7 ,1 7 7 (1 8 03 ) (“It is
em p hatically the p rov ince and du ty ofthe ju dicialdep artm ent to s ay w hat the law is .
Thos e w ho ap p ly the ru le to p articu lar cas es ,m u s t ofneces s ity ex p ou nd and interp ret
that ru le.”).
1 50 . Se e dis cu s s ion supra Section II.A.
1 51 . 1 3 8 S.Ct.1 663 ,1 67 5 (20 1 8 ) (Thom as ,J.,concu rring).
1 52. Se e id .at 1 667 .Becau s e ofthe “ready m ob ility ” ofau tom ob iles , ob taining a
w arrant for the s earch ofa v ehicle m ay not b e feas ib le in allcircu m s tances .Se e id .at
1 669 (q u oting California v . Carney , 4 7 1 U.S. 3 8 6, 3 90 (1 98 5)).As a res u lt, the
au tom ob ile ex cep tion p rov ides that “the s earch ofan au tom ob ile can b e reas onab le
w ithou t a w arrant.” Id .In Collins, the officer had “s earched [a] m otorcy cle, [w hich]
w as p arked ins ide a p artially enclos ed top p ortion of the driv ew ay ” adjoining
defendant’s hou s e.Id .at 1 667 .The Cou rt held that b ecau s e the officer had no licens e
to acces s the enclos ed p ortion of the driv ew ay w ith the garage and the p arked
m otorcy cle, his s earch ofthe m otorcy cle occu rred w ithin the cu rtilage ofthe hom e,
w here the au tom ob ile ex cep tion did not ap p ly .Se e id .at 1 67 0–7 2.
1 53 . Id .at 1 67 7 (q u oting United States v .Calandra,4 1 4 U.S.3 3 8 ,3 4 8 (1 97 4 )).
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that is ‘p ru dentialrather than cons titu tionally m andated.’”1 54 Fu rther,
he clarified that the ex clu s ionary ru le is federalcom m on law b ecau s e
it is “not grou nded in the Cons titu tion or a federals tatu te” and is ,
therefore, not b inding on the s tates u nder the Su p rem acy Clau s e.1 55
W hile noting that there are “s p ecialenclav es offederalcom m on law ”
w hich indeed b ind s tate cou rts , Ju s tice Thom as , s u p p orted b y
p recedent, conclu ded that “the ex clu s ionary ru le does not im p licate
any ofth[os e] s p ecialenclav es .”1 56 Accordingly ,he u rged the Cou rt to
recons ider the b inding natu re of the federal ex clu s ionary ru le
ju ris p ru dence on s tate cou rts .1 57
Ja rd ine s is a clear interp retation of the ex clu s ionary ru le as it
ex am ines the ex tent ofthe Fou rth Am endm ent’s p rotection agains t
u nreas onab le s earches to s u p p res s ev idence.1 5 8 H ow ev er,b ecau s e of
the w eight ofp recedent s u p p orting Ju s tice Thom as ’conclu s ion that
the U.S.Su p rem e Cou rt’s interp retation ofthe ex clu s ionary ru le and
its cav eats are not b inding on s tate cou rts , the M innes ota Su p rem e
Cou rt m ay not neces s arily b e b ou nd b y Ja rd ine s.This is es p ecially s o
b ecau s e Ja rd ine s is not on p oint, as it is dis tingu is hab le from the
circu m s tances of Chute .1 59 M ore im p ortantly , a s trong and long-
s tanding M innes ota p recedent— Sta te v.Cre a — w hich is p recis ely on
1 54 . Id .at 1 67 8 (q u oting Penns y lv ania Bd.ofProb ation and Parole v .Scott, 524
U.S.3 5 7 ,3 63 (1 998 )).
1 55. Id .(citations om itted) (“W hen the Su p rem acy Clau s e refers to ‘[t]he Law s of
the United States m ade in Pu rs u ance [ofthe Cons titu tion],’it m eans federals tatu tes ,
not federalcom m on law .” (alterations in original) (q u oting M ichaelD.Ram s ey , The
Supre m a cy Cla use ,Orig ina lM e a ning ,a nd M od e rn La w , 7 4 OH IO ST.L.J.559, 57 2–599
(201 3 ))).
1 56. Id .at 1 67 9–8 0 .The ex clu s ionary ru le does notfallw ithin the s p ecialenclav es
ofb inding federalcom m on law b ecau s e
[i]t does not gov ern the s ov ereign du ties ofthe United States or dis p u tes
ofan inters tate or internationalcharacter.Ins tead, the ru le gov erns the
m ethods that s tate p olice officers u s e to s olv e crim e and the p rocedu res
that s tate cou rts u s e at crim inal trials — s u b jects that the Federal
Gov ernm ent generally has no p ow er to regu late.Thes e are not areas
w here federalcom m on law can b ind the States .
Id .(citing United States v .M orris on, 529 U.S.598 , 61 8 (20 00 );Sm ith v .Phillip s , 4 55
U.S.20 9,221 (1 98 2)).
1 5 7 . Id .at 1 68 0 (“W e hav e not y et rev is ited that q u es tion in light ofou r m odern
p recedents , w hich reject M a pp’s es s ential p rem is e that the ex clu s ionary ru le is
req u ired b y the Cons titu tion.W e s hou ld do s o.”).
1 5 8 . Se e Florida v .Jardines ,569 U.S.1 ,7 –1 1 (201 3 ).
1 59. Se e dis cu s s ion infra Section IV.A.3 .
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p oint, w as av ailab le to the cou rt in Chute and s hou ld hav e b een
u tiliz ed ins tead.1 60
3. Jardines isDisting uisha b le from Chu te
Giv ing du e w eight to the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt’s
interp retation of the ex clu s ionary ru le’s b inding natu re and taking
Ja rd ine s to b e the controlling au thority in Chute , the cou rt’s
ap p lication of Ja rd ine s is s till im p rop er.This is p rim arily b ecau s e
Ja rd ine s is dis tingu is hab le from the cas e at b ar.1 61 In Ja rd ine s, the
ob ject b eing s earched w as the actu al cu rtilage of the defendant’s
hom e, i.e. the front p orch.1 62 The defendant there had p rov ided
neither ex p licit nor im p licit p erm is s ion to s u ch condu ct.1 63 In Chute ,
the officer s earched a rep ortedly s tolen cam p er, w hos e s tatu s as
s tolen w as already reas onab ly certain to the officer.1 64 The defendant
in Chute had giv en im p licit p erm is s ion to the p u b lic to b e on the p art
of the cu rtilage that w as the driv ew ay .1 65 The s tolen cam p er
hap p ened to b e w ithin the p lain v iew ofdefendant’s cu rtilage, w hich
w as im p liedly op en to the p u b lic.1 66 Thu s , u nlike Ja rd ine s, the officer
in Chute w as not condu cting a p hy s ical s earch of the defendant’s
cu rtilage.1 67
The Cou rt in Ja rd ine s ru led that an officer’s entry into the
cu rtilage ex ceeds the s cop e ofthe im p lied licens e w hen the officer’s
“b ehav ior ob jectiv ely rev eals a p u rp os e to condu ct a s earch.”1 68
Ja rd ine s,how ev er,did not clarify w hat it m eant b y “a s earch.”W hether
the Cou rt m eant to p rohib it the s earch of the cu rtilage its elf (as
occu rred in Ja rd ine s) or to articu late an ov erallb an on inv es tigating
any ob ject ly ing in p lain s ight on the cu rtilage is not clear.
N onetheles s ,to elu cidate the ty p e ofcondu ct that ex ceeds the im p lied
licens e,the Cou rt in Ja rd ine sp rov ided s om e ex am p les :“ex p loring the
front p ath w ith a m etaldetector,or m arching [a] b loodhou nd into the
1 60 . For the dis cu s s ion on the ap p licab ility ofState v .Crea, 3 05 M inn.3 4 2, 23 3
N .W .2d 7 3 6 (1 97 5 ),to the facts ofChute ,s ee dis cu s s ion infra Section IV.C.
1 61 . Se e 569 U.S.at 6.
1 62. Id .
1 63 . Id .
1 64 . State v .Chu te,90 8 N .W .2d 57 8 ,5 8 1 (M inn.20 1 8 ).
1 65. Id .at 58 6.
1 66. Se e id .
1 67 . Se e id .at 5 8 1 .
1 68 . Ja rd ine s,5 69 U.S.at 1 0 .
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garden b efore s ay ing hello and as king p erm is s ion.”1 69 The Cou rt als o
ex p lained that “[c]ons ent at a traffic s top to an officer’s checking ou t
an anony m ou s tip that there is a b ody in the tru nk does not p erm it the
officer to ru m m age throu gh the tru nk for narcotics .”1 7 0 The com m on
featu re connecting thes e ex am p les is that the licens ee has
im p erm is s ib ly inv es tigated or s earched only the area cov ered b y the
licens e.It is als o reas onab le to infer that,b ecau s e the licens e-at-is s u e
in Ja rd ine scov ered an area w here the hom eow ner had a reas onab le
ex p ectation ofp riv acy , i.e.the hom e’s cu rtilage, the p rohib ition ofa
s earch w ou ld als o cov er only that area.
Thu s , there is not a hint from Ja rd ine sthat inv es tigating a s tolen
v ehicle,to w hich there can b e no reas onab le ex p ectation ofp riv acy ,in
an area w here the officer has an im p lied licens e to b e, v iolates the
s cop e ofthe im p lied licens e.The ru le from Ja rd ine sap p lies neatly to
Ja rd ine s and other s cenarios w here a licens ee-officer condu cts a
s earch ofthe cu rtilage its elf.Bu t w hen ap p lied to Chute ,the ru le m u s t
b e s tretched to circu m s tances that w ere not s p ecified in its
ex p lication.Sim p ly p u t,Ja rd ine sand Chute des crib e s om ew hat s im ilar
b u t effectiv ely different s cenarios , w hich m akes the ap p lication ofthe
form er’s holding to the latter inap p os ite.
4. The M inne sota Supre m e CourtIm prope rlyDe c id e d the
Offic e r’sPurpose forBe ing onChute ’sDrive wa y
W hether the officer’s b ehav ior in Chute “ob jectiv ely rev eal[ed] a
p u rp os e to condu ct a s earch”1 7 1 is contes tab le.As Ja rd ine snoted,the
s u b jectiv e intent ofthe officer is irrelev ant.1 7 2 The q u es tion,then,is a
factu al one— w hether a reas onab le p ers on, ob s erv ing the officer’s
actions , cou ld conclu de that the officer’s p u rp os e w as to condu ct a
s earch.Qu es tions of fact are u s u ally res erv ed for the trier of fact,
w hich,in this cas e, w as the dis trict cou rt.1 7 3 Thou gh the dis trict cou rt
in Chute “did not ex p res s ly determ ine for w hat p u rp os e the officer
1 69. Se e id .at 9.
1 7 0 . Id .
1 7 1 . Id .at 1 0 .
1 7 2. Id .
1 7 3 . Issue ofFa ct(Que stionofFa ctorFa ctua lIssue ),TH E W OLTERSKLUW ER BOUVIER
LAW DICTION ARY (Des k ed.20 1 2) (“Is s u es offact are determ ined b y the trier offact,
w hich in m any cas es is a ju ry .Is s u es offact fou nd at trial, p articu larly b y a ju ry , are
giv en cons iderab le deference on ap p eal, b eing dis tu rb ed only ifthere is ev idence of
w rongdoing or m is take in the legalins tru ctions or ifthe ju ry reaches s u ch an ab s u rd
res u lt that no reas onab le ju ror cou ld hav e done s o.”).
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entered ap p ellant’s driv ew ay ,” the M innes ota Cou rt of Ap p eals
nonetheles s deem ed it p ru dent to conclu de that “the officer entered
the driv ew ay for the p u rp os e ofcondu cting a s earch.”1 7 4
In doing s o, the cou rt of ap p eals relied on H a a se and Tra c ht
b ecau s e b oth cas es “recogniz ed that [in M innes ota] the legitim acy of
an officer’s entry into the cu rtilage dep ends on his p u rp os e for
entering.”1 7 5 H ow ev er, b oth H a a se and Tra c ht are dis tingu is hab le
from Chute b ecau s e in Chute , the officer had no w ay of p os itiv ely
determ ining the identity ofthe cam p er to b e the one rep orted s tolen
b y B.F.w ithou t s tep p ing onto Chu te’s driv ew ay and ins p ecting the
cam p er’s VIN s ince the cam p er’s licens e p late had b een rem ov ed.1 7 6
In b oth Tra c ht and H a a se , the officers ’ p u rp os e for entering the
defendant’s p rop erty w as to talk to the defendants .1 7 7 In Chute , the
officer’s p u rp os e in ap p roaching Chu te’s driv ew ay w ou ld hav e b een
the s am e had the officer chos en not to take the additional,cau tionary
s tep of ens u ring the cam p er on the driv ew ay w as , in fact, the one
rep orted s tolen.1 7 8
The M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt, how ev er, did not rely on Tra c ht
or H a a se ,and u s ed “the ev idence [to] dem ons trate[] that the officer’s
p u rp os e for entering the cu rtilage w as to condu ct a s earch.”1 7 9 The
cou rt reas oned that b ecau s e the officer firs t s top p ed to look at the
1 7 4 . State v .Chu te,8 8 7 N .W .2d 8 3 4 ,8 4 2 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .20 1 6),a ff’d ,90 8 N .W .2d
57 8 (M inn.20 1 8 ).
1 7 5. Se e id .In Tra cht, the officer entered into a garage w here a v ehicle rep orted
to hav e b een in an accident w as located.Tracht v .Com m ’r ofPu b .Safety ,592 N .W .2d
8 63 , 8 64 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .1 999).The officer cou ld identify the v ehicle as the one
rep orted b ecau s e he had the v ehicle’s regis tration,the radiator w as leaking,a w indow
w as b roken,and an airb ag ex p loded.Id .H e had no need to fu rther ex am ine the car—
allthe neces s ary ev idence w as av ailab le from a s u rface glance.Se e id .Sim ilarly , in
H a a se v.Com m ’rofPub .Sa fe ty,the officer had the s u s p ected v ehicle’s licens e p late
nu m b er and regis tration to b e ab le to identify it as the rep orted v ehicle, w hile he w as
s tanding at the thres hold ofan op en garage door.67 9 N .W .2d 7 4 3 ,7 4 5 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .
20 04 ).
1 7 6. Com pa re Tra cht, 592 N .W .2d at 8 64 (ex p laining that the officer had the
v ehicle’s regis tration and cou ld identify the rep orted v ehicle from s igns that it had
b een in an accident), a nd H a a se , 67 9 N .W .2d at 7 4 5 (ex p laining that the officer had
the s u s p ected v ehicle’s licens e p late nu m b er and regis tration to find a p os itiv e m atch
w ith the rep orted v ehicle), w ith Chute , 8 8 7 N .W .2d at 8 3 9 (ex p laining that the
v ehicle’s licens e p late had b een rem ov ed and the VIN w as only p artially av ailab le).
1 7 7 . Se e Chute , 8 8 7 N .W .2d at 8 4 2 (dis cu s s ing Tra cht, 592 N .W .2d at 8 64 , and
H a a se ,67 9 N .W .2d at 7 4 5).
1 7 8 . Se e supra notes 1 7 5–1 7 7 and accom p any ing tex t.
1 7 9. State v .Chu te,90 8 N .W .2d 57 8 ,5 8 6–8 7 (M inn.20 1 8 ).
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cam p er on the driv ew ay b efore u s ing the driv ew ay to reach the b ack
entrance and s eek Chu te, any ob jectiv e v iew er “w ou ld conclu de that
his p u rp os e w as not to q u es tion the res ident of the hou s e, b u t to
ins p ect the cam p er.”1 8 0 The cou rt, thu s , p rodu ced a “res u lt of
reas oning from the ev identiary facts ”— the v ery definition for finding
offact— w hich the dis trict cou rt is in a b etter p os ition to m ake.1 8 1 At
the v ery b eginning of the analy s is s ection of the op inion, the
M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt noted that “[w ]hen rev iew ing a p retrial
order deny ing a m otion to s u p p res s , w e rev iew the dis trict cou rt’s
factu al findings for clear error and its legal determ inations de
nov o.”1 8 2 H ere,how ev er,the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt m ade its ow n
factu al findings , rather than rev iew ing “the dis trict cou rt’s factu al
findings for clear error.”1 8 3
The ob jectiv e p u rp os e b ehind the officer’s entry into Chu te’s
driv ew ay w as a factu alm atter that s hou ld hav e b een determ ined b y
the dis trict cou rt,w hich w as in a b etter p os ition to m ake s u ch findings
offact.Cons eq u ently , the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt, at a m inim u m ,
s hou ld hav e rem anded the cas e to the dis trict cou rt to m ake s u ch
findings in accordance w ith the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt’s findings
oflaw .
B. The Ine vita b le Discove ryRule a sa nExc e ptiontothe Purpose
Lim ita tionofa nIm plie d Lic e nse
The cru x of the analy s is in Chute is b as ed on the M innes ota
Su p rem e Cou rt’s finding that the officer had ex ceeded the s cop e ofhis
im p lied licens e to b e on the defendant’s driv ew ay .1 8 4 The cou rt held
that the s cop e of the im p lied licens e w as lim ited not only to the
driv ew ay ’s s p atialb ou ndaries , b u t als o b y the p u rp os e for w hich it
w as granted.1 8 5 According to the cou rt, the p u rp os e of the im p lied
licens e w as lim ited to u s ing the driv ew ay to ap p roach the b ack
entrance of the defendant’s hou s e.1 8 6 The officer, b y s top p ing to
1 8 0 . Id .at 58 7 .
1 8 1 . Se e Find ing of fa ct, BALLEN TIN E’S LAW DICTION ARY (3 d ed. 1 969) (citation
om itted).
1 8 2. Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 3 (citing State v .M ilton,8 21 N .W .2d 7 8 9,7 9 8 (M inn.
20 1 2)).
1 8 3 . Se e id .
1 8 4 . Id .at 58 6–8 7 (“Bas ed on the ev idence, w e conclu de that the offer’s intru s ion
v iolated the lim itations ofthe im p lied licens e to enter Chu te’s p rop erty .”).
1 8 5. Id .at 58 6 (citing Florida v .Jardines ,5 69 U.S.1 ,9 (201 3 )).
1 8 6. Id .at 58 6–8 7 .
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inv es tigate the s tolen cam p er on the driv ew ay , had ex ceeded this
p u rp os e lim itation of the licens e.1 8 7 As a res u lt, the officer’s
inv es tigation ofthe cam p er w as u nreas onab le,and ev idence ob tained
from the inv es tigation w as inadm is s ib le.1 8 8 The m ajority ’s reas oning
s eem s s ou nd and com p lete w hen v iew ed w ithin the narrow s chem e
ofthe p u rp os e lim itation to an im p lied licens e.
There is , how ev er, reas on to q u es tion the com p letenes s ofthe
cou rt’s analy s is .In Chute , the cou rt failed to addres s the inev itab le
dis cov ery ru le in as s es s ing the inadm is s ib ility of the ev idence
ob tained b y the officer’s s earch.1 8 9 The inev itab le dis cov ery ru le
allow s for the adm is s ion ofev idence ob tained u nlaw fu lly , w hen the
ev idence w ou ld hav e b een dis cov ered ev en in the ab s ence ofu nlaw fu l
p olice condu ct.1 90 The dis cov ery ofev idence,in that cas e,is inev itab le
and thu s adm is s ib le.The inev itab le dis cov ery ru le— as an ex cep tion
to the ex clu s ionary ru le— has b een adop ted in M innes ota as w ell1 91
1 8 7 . Id .at 58 7 .
1 8 8 . Id .at 58 8 .
1 8 9. Id .H ow ev er,the Cou rt in Chute m ay hav e b een ju s tified in not addres s ing the
inev itab le dis cov ery doctrine.The is s u e ofw hether the ev idence ofthe s tolen cam p er
w ou ld hav e b een dis cov ered w ithou t the officer’s u nlaw fu l p res ence in Chu te’s
driv ew ay w as not rais ed b y either p arty .And traditionally , it has b een the cas e that
“[a]n ap p ellate cou rt decides only the is s u es p res ented b y the p arties .” H am p ton v .
Su p erior Cou rt ofL.A.Cty .,24 2 P.2d 1 ,3 (Cal.1 95 2).Since an ap p ellate cou rt,like the
M innes ota Cou rt ofAp p eals ,is generally lim ited in its au thority to rev iew m atters and
legal is s u es b ey ond the record, it m ay hav e b een reas onab le for the M innes ota
Su p rem e Cou rt to not rev iew the is s u e ofinev itab le dis cov ery in Chute .
1 90 . The s em inalcas e, adop ting and ap p ly ing the inev itab le dis cov ery doctrine,
is Nixv.W illia m s,4 67 U.S.4 3 1 (1 98 4 ).In Nix,the p olice had elicited a confes s ion from
the defendant regarding the location of his m u rdered v ictim ’s b ody , w ithou t the
p res ence ofdefendant’s cou ns el,thereb y v iolating the defendant’s Six th Am endm ent
right to cou ns el.Id .at 4 3 5–3 6.Becau s e the confes s ion w as ob tained in an u nlaw fu l
m anner, the defendant s ou ght to s u p p res s its ev idence.Id .at 4 3 6–3 7 .There w as ,
how ev er, a large s earch p arty already looking for the v ictim ’s b ody .Id .at 4 3 5–3 6.
Accordingly ,the Cou rt fou nd that the location ofthe b ody w ou ld hav e b een inev itab ly
dis cov ered, ev en w ithou t the defendant’s confes s ion, and thu s , the ev idence ofthe
confes s ion and its fru its w ere adm is s ib le.Id .at 4 4 9–50 .
1 91 . Se e ,e .g ., State v .Licari, 659 N .W .2d 24 3 , 255–56 (M inn.20 03 ) (adm itting
ev idence ob tained from the w arrantles s s earch ofdefendant’s s torage u nit b ecau s e
the w eight ofother ev idence agains t the defendant w ou ld hav e inev itab ly granted the
officer a s earch w arrant for the s torage u nit); State v .H arris , 590 N .W .2d 90 , 1 0 5
(M inn.1 999) (recogniz ing an ex cep tion to the ex clu s ionary ru le w hen ev idence of
m ariju ana ob tained from s earching the ins ide ofdefendant’s jacket s leev e,as op p os ed
to a p rop er,“p rotectiv e ou ter-clothing p at-dow n s earch,”w as inev itab ly dis cov erab le
from the “totality of the circu m s tances ,” that is , “w hen ‘the p olice w ou ld hav e
ob tained the ev idence ifno m is condu ct had taken p lace’” (citations om itted));In re
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b ecau s e “ex clu s ion of ev idence that w ou ld inev itab ly hav e b een
dis cov ered w ou ld p u t the p ros ecu tion in a w ors e p os ition,”1 92 w hich
is not the intent ofthe ex clu s ionary ru le.
To ob tain the b enefits ofthe inev itab le dis cov ery doctrine, the
p ros ecu tion m u s t “es tab lis h b y a p rep onderance ofthe ev idence that
the inform ation u ltim ately or inev itab ly w ou ld hav e b een dis cov ered
b y law fu lm eans .”1 93 Cou rts m u s t ap p ly the inev itab le dis cov ery ru le
narrow ly s o that it “inv olv es no s p ecu lativ e elem ents b u t focu s es on
dem ons trated his torical facts cap ab le of ready v erification or
im p eachm ent.”1 94 In Chute ,the cou rt w ou ld not hav e had to s p ecu late
too m u ch to find that the s tolen natu re ofthe cam p er w as inev itab ly
dis cov erab le from the his toricalfacts .
Firs t, the ow ner of the cam p er, B.F., had already reas onab ly
identified that the cam p er on Chu te’s driv ew ay w as B.F.’s s tolen
cam p er, ev en b efore the officer’s u nlaw fu l inv es tigation.1 95 The
officer, at that p oint, cou ld hav e law fu lly ob tained a w arrant for the
s earch ofthe cam p er b ecau s e he cou ld es tab lis h p rob ab le cau s e from
B.F.’s v erification.1 96 In that cas e, the s earch of the cam p er, w hich
W elfare ofJ.W .K.,5 8 3 N .W .2d 7 52,7 5 7 (M inn.1 998 ) (“[A]p p lication ofthe inev itab le
ex cep tion dis cov ery p reclu des the s u p p res s ion of the [ev idence] ....”); Tracht v .
Com m ’r of Pu b .Safety , 592 N .W .2d 8 63 , 8 65 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .1 999) (finding that
ev idence ofthe defendant’s intox ication, ev en ifob tained u nlaw fu lly , “w ou ld hav e
[b een] inev itab ly dis cov ered[,] ...res u lting in [defendant’s ] arres t for DW Iand the
rev ocation ofhis driv er’s licens e”).
1 92. W e lfa re ofJ.W .K.,5 8 3 N .W .2d at 7 56.
1 93 . Nix, 4 67 U.S.at 4 4 4 .M innes ota als o recogniz es the p rep onderance-of-the-
ev idence s tandard-of-p roof— the b u rden of w hich is b orne b y p ros ecu tion— for
s atis fy ing the inev itab le-dis cov ery ex cep tion to the ex clu s ionary ru le.Se e Lica ri,659
N .W .2d at 254 (“Ifthe s tate can es tab lis h b y a p rep onderance ofthe ev idence that the
fru its ofa challenged s earch ‘u ltim ately or inev itab ly w ou ld hav e b een dis cov ered b y
law fu lm eans ,’then the s eiz ed ev idence is adm is s ib le ev en ifthe s earch v iolated the
w arrant req u irem ent.”(q u oting Nix, 4 67 U.S.at 4 4 4 ));se e a lsoState v .Sherm an, N o.
A1 3 -0 08 0 , 20 1 4 W L 3 4 964 3 , at *1 , *4 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .Feb .3 , 20 1 4 ) (s am e);Tra cht,
592 N .W .2d at 8 66 (“Res p ondent Com m is s ioner ofPu b lic Safety has the b u rden of
p rov ing that the inev itab le dis cov ery ex cep tion ap p lies .”(citing State v .Bau m an,5 8 6
N .W .2d 4 1 6,4 23 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .1 998 ),re vie w d e nie d (M inn.Jan.27 ,1 999))).
1 94 . Lica ri,659 N .W .2d at 254 (q u oting Nix,4 67 U.S.at 4 4 4 –4 5 n.5).
1 95. State v .Chu te,90 8 N .W .2d 57 8 ,5 8 1 (M inn.20 1 8 ).
1 96. Se e id .The officer w ou ld hav e had p rob ab le cau s e to ob tain a s earch w arrant
b ecau s e the cam p er s p otted b y B.F.on Chu te’s driv ew ay “m atched the des crip tion of
the s tolen trailer in the p olice rep ort m ade at the tim e of the theft.” Id .M ore
im p ortantly ,B.F.later rep orted it to the p olice and “tes tified that he cou ld recogniz e
the cam p er from Cou nty Road D b ecau s e he cou ld s ee a s eries ofb olts that he had
ins talled along the rear ov erhang ofthe roofw hen m aking rep airs on the cam p er.”Id .
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w ou ld inev itab ly rev ealthat it w as s tolen, w ou ld hav e b een entirely
law fu l.
Second, the facts s u gges t that Chu te w ou ld hav e com p lied and
as s is ted the officer w ith the s earch, w hich w ou ld hav e inev itab ly led
to the dis cov ery ofB.F.’s s tolen cam p er.Chu te had already cons ented
to a s earch ofhis hom e and garage after s p eaking w ith the officer,ev en
thou gh he w as s toring B.F.’s s tolen p rop erty in thos e locations .1 97 It
w ou ld not hav e b een s p ecu lativ e for the cou rt to find that Chu te als o
w ou ld hav e allow ed the officer to s earch the cam p er had the officer
p res ented him s elfw ith or w ithou t a w arrant.1 98 The cou rt’s treatm ent
ofthe his toricalfacts w ou ld hav e likely b een s u fficient at this p oint,
and it w ou ld not need to as s es s w hether the officer acted in good faith
in s earching the cam p er w ithou t a w arrant.1 99
N ev ertheles s , the fact that the is s u e ofinev itab le dis cov ery w as
not rais ed in either ofthe low er cou rts leads a concerned ob s erv er to
q u es tion if it w ou ld hav e b een p rop er for the M innes ota Su p rem e
Cou rt to hav e rais ed the is s u e s u a s p onte.This concern regarding the
s u a s p onte cons ideration of an is s u e b y an ap p ellate cou rt is not
entirely w ithou t s u p p ort.200 In M innes ota, how ev er, ap p ellate cou rts
hav e b rou ght u p the ap p licab ility ofthe inev itab le dis cov ery ru le on
their ow n.201 For ex am p le, in Sta te v.Lic a ri, the M innes ota Su p rem e
Cou rt recogniz ed that “is s u es that are rais ed for the firs t tim e on
1 97 . Se e id .at 5 8 1 –8 2.
1 98 . Se e id .
1 99. Se e Nix, 4 67 U.S.at 4 4 5 (“The req u irem ent that the p ros ecu tion m u s t p rov e
the ab s ence ofb ad faith ...w ou ld p lace cou rts in the p os ition ofw ithholding from
ju ries relev ant and u ndou b ted tru th that w ou ld hav e b een av ailab le to p olice ab s ent
any u nlaw fu lp olice activ ity .Of cou rs e, that v iew w ou ld p u t the p olice in a w orse
p os ition than they w ou ld hav e b een in if no u nlaw fu lcondu ct had trans p ired....
N othing in this Cou rt’s p rior holdings s u p p orts any s u ch form alis tic, p ointles s , and
p u nitiv e ap p roach.”);Chute ,908 N .W .2d at 58 3 .
20 0 . Se e g e ne ra lly Allan D.Ves tal, Sua Sponte Consid e ra tion in Appe lla te Re vie w ,
27 FORDH AM L.REV.4 7 7 (1 95 8 ) (ex p loring the his tory and tradition ofins tances and
reas ons for ap p ellate cou rts rais ing is s u es s u a s p onte and argu ing that ap p ellate
cou rts rev iew ing is s u es not rais ed b y litigants or low er cou rts m ay not alw ay s b e
ou ts ide the cou rt’s au thority , des p ite the general ru le agains t s u ch s u a s p onte
cons ideration).
20 1 . Se e State v .Licari,65 9 N .W .2d 24 3 ,255–56 (M inn.200 3 );State v .Sherm an,
N o.A1 3 -00 8 0 ,20 1 4 W L3 4 964 3 ,at *4 n.3 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .Feb .3 ,20 1 4 ) (“In this cas e,
the dis trict cou rt rais ed the inev itab le-dis cov ery doctrine sua sponte and ru led in the
s tate’s fav or.”).Althou gh in She rm a n, it w as the dis trict cou rt, and not the ap p ellate
cou rt,that addres s ed the inev itab le dis cov ery doctrine s u a s p onte,it s tills erv es as an
ex am p le ofa cou rt b eing ab le to rais e is s u es u naddres s ed b y litigants on its ow n.
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ap p eal”m ay b e heard and addres s ed b y the ap p ellate b ody “w hen the
interes ts ofju s tice req u ire their cons ideration and addres s ing them
w ou ld not w ork an u nfair s u rp ris e on a p arty .”202 Althou gh the cou rt
in Lic a riaddres s ed the is s u e of u nlaw fu lly -ob tained ev idence b eing
inev itab ly dis cov ered for the firs t tim e on ap p eal, the is s u e w as
nonetheles s rais ed b y a p arty in the litigation, i.e.the s tate, and not
entirely s u a s p onte b y the cou rt.203 The M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt in
Lic a ridecided to rem and the cas e on the is s u e ofinev itab le dis cov ery ,
am ong others , b ecau s e there w ere “legalis s u es s u gges ted b y th[e]
record b u t not addres s ed b y the dis trict cou rt”and “the grav ity ofthe
offens e charged” called for fu rther findings b y the dis trict cou rt.204
Sim ilarly , in Chute , there w ere legal is s u es , nam ely , the inev itab le
dis cov ery ex cep tion, that the record s u gges ted b u t the dis trict cou rt
had not addres s ed.205 Althou gh the offens e charged in Chute w as not
as grav e as m u rder (the charge in Lic a ri),206 it w ou ld not b e an
onerou s b u rden on the dis trict cou rt to hav e the cas e rem anded on
the is s u e ofinev itab le dis cov ery .
Fu rtherm ore, a m ajority of s tate cou rts hav e held, to v ary ing
degrees , that they hav e the au thority to addres s the is s u e of an
im p ortant ex cep tion like the inev itab le dis cov ery doctrine s u a
s p onte.207 The generalcons ens u s am ong thes e s tate cou rts is that if
20 2. Lica ri, 659 N .W .2d at 256 (q u oting State v .Sorens on, 4 4 1 N .W .2d 4 55, 4 57
(M inn. 1 98 9)). In Lica ri, the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt addres s ed the is s u e of
inev itab le dis cov ery for the firs t tim e on ap p ealw hile recogniz ing that “the s tate m ay
hav e w aiv ed an argu m ent that w ou ld otherw is e s u p p ort an order deny ing a m otion
to s u p p res s ev idence ifthe argu m ent req u ires a factu alrecord and the s tate failed to
dev elop that record at the om nib u s hearing.”Id .at 255–56 (citing Garz a v .State,63 2
N .W .2d 63 3 ,63 7 (M inn.200 1 )).
20 3 . Se e id .at 250 .
20 4 . Id .at 256.
20 5. Se e supra tex t accom p any ing notes 1 94 –98 .
20 6. Lica ri,659 N .W .2d at 24 6.
20 7 . Se e ,e .g .,Peop le v .H icks ,5 3 9 N .E.2d 7 56,7 62 (Ill.Ct.Ap p .1 98 9) (“[T]he trial
ju dge here did not im p rop erly act as a p ros ecu tor w hen he s u a s p onte rais ed the is s u e
of inev itab le dis cov ery .”); Elliott v . State, 1 0 A.3 d 7 61 , 7 7 5, 7 7 7 –7 8 (M d. 201 0)
(holding that ifthere is ev idence relating to inev itab le dis cov ery in the record, and
the ap p ellate cou rt’s inq u iry ofthe is s u e w ou ld not b e s p ecu lativ e,then the cou rt m ay
ap p ly the doctrine s u a s p onte); Lacey v . State, 3 8 9 P.3 d 23 3 , 23 8 (M ont.201 7 )
(“N oting that w e cou ld ap p ly the inev itab le dis cov ery ex cep tion s u a s p onte—
’p rov ided there is a s u fficient record’....”(citation om itted));Gu thrie v .W eb er, 7 67
N .W .2d 53 9, 54 8 (S.D.20 09) (“Bas ed on ou r rev iew ofthe cas e law and the intent
b ehind the inev itab le dis cov ery doctrine,w e conclu de that a cou rt’s s u a s p onte ru ling
that ev idence w ou ld inev itab ly hav e b een dis cov ered is p rop er only w hen there is no
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there is s u fficient ev idence in the record to s u p p ort inev itab le
dis cov ery , and it w ou ld not b e u nfairly p reju dicialfor the cou rt to
rais e the is s u e for the firs t tim e on ap p ealor otherw is e, then a cou rt
m ay s u a s p onte ap p ly the inev itab le dis cov ery doctrine.208 Since
M innes ota has adop ted the inev itab le dis cov ery doctrine and allow s
for s u a s p onte cons ideration ofthe is s u e b y the cou rt,the Chute cou rt
s hou ld hav e allow ed p ros ecu tion to s how inev itab le dis cov ery b y a
p rep onderance ofthe ev idence,giv en the s u fficiency ofthe his torical
facts on record.
C. Chu te De pa rtsfrom PriorM inne sota Pre c e d e nc e
Althou gh b oth the m ajority and dis s ent in Chute chos e to focu s on
s cru tiniz ing w hether Chu te’s driv ew ay fellw ithin the cu rtilage ofhis
hom e, this cas e cou ld hav e readily follow ed the p recedent s et in
Cre a .209 The Chute m ajority u s ed Cre a to s u p p ort the conv iction that
the driv ew ay ofa hou s e is w ithin its cu rtilage b u t failed to inclu de in
its dis cu s s ion that in Cre a , the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt fou nd the
p olice’s entry into the driv ew ay to condu ct a s earch of the s tolen
s now m ob iles , w ithou t a w arrant, entirely p erm is s ib le.21 0 Althou gh
the dis s ent recogniz ed, in a footnote,21 1 Cre a ’s holding ofp erm itting
officers to “keep their ey es op en” w hen officers are in an area
“im p liedly op en to u s e b y the p u b lic,”21 2 m os t of the dis s ent’s
argu m ent w as , nonetheles s , focu s ed on ap p ly ing the Dunn factors to
find the driv ew ay w as not cu rtilage.21 3
The facts ofCre a are s trikingly s im ilar to the facts here.21 4 W hile
in Cre a ,the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt fou nd defendant’s driv ew ay to
other ev idence that cou ld b e offered to defeat the theory .”);State v .W inters tein,220
P.3 d 1 226, 1 23 0 (W as h.200 9) (“[T]he Cou rt ofAp p eals at oralargu m ent rais ed the
is s u e ofinev itab le dis cov ery s u a s p onte.”).
20 8 . Se e cas es cited supra note 20 7 .
20 9. Se e Chute , 90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 3 –92; State v .Crea, 3 0 5 M inn.3 4 2, 3 4 6, 23 3
N .W .2d 7 3 6,7 3 9–4 0 (1 97 5).
21 0 . Com pa re Chute , 90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 4 , 5 8 7 , w ith Cre a , 3 05 M inn.at 3 4 6, 23 3
N .W .2d at 7 3 9–4 0 .
21 1 . Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 9 n.1 (M cKeig,J.,dis s enting).
21 2. Cre a , 3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 6,23 3 N .W .2d at 7 3 9 (as q u oted in Chute , 90 8 N .W .2d
at 5 8 9 n.1 ).
21 3 . Se e Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 5 8 8 –92 (M cKeig,J.,dis s enting).
21 4 . Se e 3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 3 –4 5, 23 3 N .W .2d at 7 3 8 –3 9.In Cre a , the officers w ere
res p onding to rep orts ofs om e s now m ob iles b eing s tolen.Id .They w ere ab le to locate
the hou s e w here the s now m ob iles w ere rep ortedly b eing s tored. Id .W hen they
reached the hou s e, the officers , w ithou t a w arrant, w alked dow n the driv ew ay and
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b e w ithin the cu rtilage ofhis hou s e,the cou rt did not u s e the cu rtilage
determ ination to lim it the officers ’au thority to ex am ine s now m ob iles
on the driv ew ay s ince the driv ew ay w as im p liedly op en to the
p u b lic.21 5 Ap p ly ing Cre a to the facts ofChute , the cou rt cou ld hav e
eas ily fou nd Chu te’s driv ew ay to hav e b een cu rtilage— thereb y
p rotecting him from a p hy s ical s earch of the driv ew ay — w ithou t
p rohib iting the p olice from ex am ining the cam p er, w hich w as w ithin
p lain s ight and did not req u ire the p olice to intru de into any other p art
ofChu te’s p rop erty .
Ab s ent an ex p lanation ofhow Ja rd ine saffects M innes ota’s cas e
p recedence, s p ecifically Cre a and Kre c h, the m ajority ’s focu s on
Ja rd ine s’s p u rp os e lim itation of an im p lied licens e is m is p laced.21 6
W ithou t ex p licitly ov ertu rning Cre a b ecau s e of the U.S. Su p rem e
Cou rt’s decis ion in Ja rd ine s, it w as im p rop er for the cou rt in Chute to
neglect ap p ly ing Cre a w hen the facts of Cre a and Chute w ere s o
s im ilar.Sta te v.Cre a , w hich is s tillgood law in M innes ota,21 7 s hou ld
s aw tw o s now m ob ile trailers in front ofa detached garage and b ehind the hou s e.Id .
They ex am ined the area and fou nd s now m ob iles tracks in the s now leading to the
b as em ent.Id .Cons eq u ently , the officers w ent to the hou s e and ob tained cons ent to
s earch from defendant.Id .The cou rt held that the officers had the right to w alk on the
driv ew ay to ex am ine the trailers , w hich w ere in p lain s ight, s ince the driv ew ay w as
p art ofthe cu rtilage, w hich w as im p liedly op en to the p u b lic.3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 2, 23 3
N .W .2d at 7 3 6.
21 5. Se e 3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 2,23 3 N .W .2d at 7 3 6.
21 6. Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 58 9 n.1 (M cKeig,J.,dis s enting) (“Thu s , u nder Kre chand
Cre a ,the key inq u iry is w hether the area in q u es tion is ‘an area im p liedly op en to u s e
b y the p u b lic’— in w hich cas e inv es tigativ e b ehav ior is theoretically p erm is s ib le— not
w hether an area is w ithin the cu rtilage. Becau s e thes e cas es s et only spa tia l
lim itations on the im p lied licens e to enter the cu rtilage and s u gges t that there are no
purpose lim itations on the licens e, they m ay req u ire recons ideration in light of
Ja rd ine s.” (citing Kre ch, 4 0 3 N .W .2d 63 4 , Cre a , 3 0 5 M inn.3 4 2, 23 3 N .W .2d 7 3 6;
Ja rd ine s,569 U.S.1 )).
21 7 . For recent M innes ota cas es s tillfollow ing Sta te v.Cre a , 3 0 5 M inn.3 4 2, 23 3
N .W .2d 7 3 6 (1 97 5), s ee: State v .H iggins , N o.A1 4 -1 0 00 , 20 1 5 W L 51 94 07 9, at *4
(M inn.Ct.Ap p .Sep .8 , 201 5) (citing Cre a , 3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 3 –4 4 , 3 4 6, 23 3 N .W .2d at
7 3 8 , 7 3 9) (finding that b ecau s e the defendant cou ld not hav e a reas onab le
ex p ectation ofp riv acy in his ab andoned garb age b ags , regardles s of w hether they
w ere on the driv ew ay , the s earch of the garb age b ags w as not u ncons titu tional)
(“Accordingly , w e do not agree that driv ew ay s hav e b een deem ed cu rtilage as a
m atter oflaw .”);State v .Kronz er, N o.A1 2-0 4 0 0 , 20 1 2 W L66525 96, at *2 (M inn.Ct.
Ap p .Dec.24 ,201 2) (“Cou rts hav e held that p olice w ith legitim ate b u s ines s m ay enter
the areas ofthe cu rtilage w hich are im p liedly op en to u s e b y the p u b lic....and in s u ch
a s itu ation the p olice are free to keep their ey es op en and u s e their other s ens es .”
(q u oting Cre a , 3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 6, 23 3 N .W .2d at 7 3 9));State v .Elam , N o.A08 -04 22,
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control.In Sta te v.H ig g ins,the M innes ota Cou rt ofAp p eals s p ecifically
u p held the p arts of Cre a w hich directly correlate to Chute : p olice
officers “w alking onto the driv ew ay and their ex am ination of the
trailers w hich w ere in p lain s ight.”21 8 Sim ilarly , the cou rt ofap p eals ,
in Sta te v.Ela m , chos e to u p hold the v alidity ofw arrantles s s earches
on im p liedly -op en areas like driv ew ay s , w hen the s p ecificfacts ofthe
cas e m atched thos e of Cre a ’s , w hile ab rogating Cre a ’s b road
au thoriz ation ofw arrantles s s earches on the cu rtilage.21 9
Thu s ,ifthe facts and circu m s tances ofa cas e,like Chute ,narrow ly
m atch that of Cre a ’s , M innes ota cou rts are b ou nd b y Cre a ’s ru ling.
Becau s e, u nder the reas onab le-ex p ectation-of-p riv acy s tandard,
Chu te cou ld not hav e a legitim ate ex p ectation of p riv acy in the
driv ew ay that w as im p licitly op en to the p u b lic,220 ab s ent an ex p res s
ab rogation of Cre a , the s earch of the s tolen cam p er on Chu te’s
driv ew ay w as p rop er.
D. Chu te’s Im pa c tonFuture De c isions
The Chute decis ion req u ires officers to not keep their s ens es op en
w hile b eing law fu lly on land w here they hav e a p rob ab le cau s e to
s u s p ect crim inal activ ity .221 By req u iring officers w ith m ore than
p rob ab le cau s e to firs t s eek the hom eow ner— w hen the s u s p ected
ob ject is w ithin the officers ’p lain s ight on land im p liedly op en to the
p u b lic— the cou rt’s decis ion w illcau s e im p racticaldelay s and, w ors e,
trigger the ex clu s ionary ru le u nder the Fou rth Am endm ent.222
20 09 W L 23 4 1 3 6, at *3 (M inn.Ct.Ap p .Feb .3 , 20 09) (citing Cre a , 3 0 5 M inn.at 3 4 6,
23 3 N .W .2d at 7 3 9; State v . Carter, 5 69 N .W .2d 1 69, 1 7 8 n.1 5 (M inn. 1 997 ))
(ab rogating Cre a ’s three-p art tes t for v alidating a w arrantles s s earch w hile s till
holding that “areas of cu rtilage that are im p liedly op en to p u b lic u s e, s u ch as
driv ew ay s and p orches ,m ay b e s earched w ithou t a w arrant b ecau s e they do not offer
a p ers on a reas onab le ex p ectation ofp riv acy ”).
21 8 . Se e H ig g ins, 20 1 5 W L 51 94 07 9,at *4 (“W e do not read Cre a to b e s o b road
as to m ean that ev ery p art ofev ery driv ew ay is cons idered cu rtilage.Ins tead, the
s u p rem e cou rt’s dis cu s s ion in Cre a is lim ited to thos e s p ecificfacts .”).
21 9. Se e Ela m ,20 09 W L23 4 1 3 6,at *3 .
220 . Se e Chute ,90 8 N .W .2d at 591 (M cKeig,J.,dis s enting).
221 . Se e id .at 5 8 8 .
222. W ith the Chute decis ion,ev idence that cou ld hav e nonetheles s b een ob tained
w ithou t the u nlaw fu l s earch now has to b e s u p p res s ed b ecau s e of Chute ’s b road
concep tion ofan u nreas onab le s earch.Under Nixv.W illia m s,ifthe ev idence ob tained
in the u nlaw fu l s earch w ou ld alm os t definitely hav e b een fou nd ev entu ally ev en
w ithou t s aid s earch (inev itab le dis cov ery ), the ev idence m ay b e b rou ght forth in
cou rt.4 67 U.S.4 3 1 , 4 4 1 –4 6 (1 98 4 ) (holding that as long as p olice hav e not acted in
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W henev er the ex clu s ionary ru le is triggered, the inev itab le s ocial
cos ts ofs u p p res s ion com e along w ith it, and cou rts m u s t engage in a
tim e-cons u m ing,cos t-b enefit analy s is ofs u p p res s ing the ev idence.223
Ev en thou gh the ex clu s ionary ru le is m eant to deter p olice
m is condu ct,there are m any ins tances ofthe ru le’s ap p lication w here
p olice officers act in good faith,b u t the econom icand s ocialim p act of
the ex clu s ionary ru le goes u nchecked.224
By ex p anding the reach of the ex clu s ionary ru le, the Chute
decis ion dev iates from the p olicy b ehind the ru le225 and creates
u nreas onab le difficu lties for law enforcem ent officers and
p ros ecu tors in condu cting (w hat w ou ld hav e otherw is e b een) law fu l
s earches .The reas oning of Chute als o m akes it difficu lt for fu tu re
b ad faith in condu cting an u nlaw fu ls earch,the inev itab le dis cov ery ex cep tion to the
ex clu s ionary ru le ap p lies ).
223 . Se e Dav is v .United States ,564 U.S.229,23 7 (20 1 1 ) (“The analy s is m u s t als o
accou nt for the ‘s u b s tantials ocialcos ts ’ generated b y the ru le.Ex clu s ion ex acts a
heav y tollon b oth the ju dicials y s tem and s ociety at large.It alm os t alw ay s req u ires
cou rts to ignore reliab le,tru s tw orthy ev idence b earing on gu ilt or innocence.And its
b ottom -line effect, in m any cas es , is to s u p p res s the tru th and s et the crim inalloos e
in the com m u nity w ithou t p u nis hm ent.” (citations om itted)).Se e g e ne ra llyRandy E.
Barnett,Re solving the Dile m m a ofthe Exclusiona ryRule :An Applica tion ofRe stitutive
Principle s of Justice , 3 2 EM ORY L.J.93 7 (1 98 3 ) (argu ing for the need to find an
alternativ e to the ex clu s ionary ru le).
224 . Se e Tonja Jacob i, The La w a nd Econom icsofthe Exclusiona ryRule , 8 7 N OTRE
DAM E L.REV.5 8 5,592–60 7 ,61 7 –3 0 (201 3 ).
A s tu dy of los t arres ts in California from 1 97 6 throu gh 1 97 9 b y the
N ationalIns titu te of Ju s tice fou nd that 6% of arres tee releas es b y the
p olice w ere du e to s earch and s eiz u re p rob lem s ,4 .8 % ofallfelony arres ts
w ere rejected b y p ros ecu tors b ecau s e of s earch and s eiz u re p rob lem s ,
and 3 .7 % offelony dis m is s als at the cou rt lev elw ere du e to s earch and
s eiz u re p rob lem s .In narcotics cas es , w here the ex clu s ionary ru le has its
greates t im p act,ap p rox im ately 3 0 % offelony dru g arres ts w ere rejected
du e to s earch and s eiz u re p rob lem s .
Id .at 597 –98 (footnotes and citations om itted).
225. Se e United States v .Leon,4 68 U.S.8 9 7 ,91 9–20 (1 98 4 ) (“In s hort, w here the
officer’s condu ct is ob jectiv ely reas onab le,‘ex clu ding the ev idence w illnot fu rther the
ends ofthe ex clu s ionary ru le in any ap p reciab le w ay ;for it is p ainfu lly ap p arent that
... the officer is acting as a reas onab le officer w ou ld and s hou ld act in s im ilar
circu m s tances .Ex clu ding the ev idence can in no w ay affect his fu tu re condu ct u nles s
it is to m ake him les s w illing to do his du ty .’”(q u oting Stone v .Pow ell, 4 28 U.S.4 65,
53 9–4 0 (1 97 6) (W hite, J., dis s enting))); United States v .Peltier, 4 22 U.S.53 1 , 54 2
(1 97 5) (“Ifthe p u rp os e ofthe ex clu s ionary ru le is to deter u nlaw fu lp olice condu ct,
then ev idence ob tained from a s earch s hou ld b e s u p p res s ed only ifit can b e s aid that
the law enforcem ent officer had know ledge, or m ay p rop erly b e charged w ith
know ledge,that the s earch w as u ncons titu tionalu nder the Fou rth Am endm ent.”).
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cou rts to decide cas es w ith s im ilar facts to Chute and Cre a ,as the tw o
decis ions com e to different conclu s ions for v ery s im ilar facts .M ore
im p ortantly , Ju s tice Cardoz o’s fear that the crim inal w ill go free
b ecau s e of a p olice officer’s p rocedu ral b lu nder, m ade u nder
circu m s tances u ncom m on to the av erage p ers on, is ex acerb ated b y
the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt’s ru ling in Chute .226
V. CON CLUSION
The q u es tion b efore the M innes ota Su p rem e Cou rt w as com p lex
in that it req u ired the cou rt to delineate the s cop e ofthe cu rtilage
ex cep tion to the op en-fields doctrine w hen a p olice officer has
p rob ab le cau s e to ex am ine a rep ortedly s tolen ob ject, identified as
s u ch b y the ow ner,on s aid p rop erty .227 Althou gh the lengths to w hich
the m ajority and dis s ent w ent to p rop erly analy z e the ap p lication of
the Dunn factors w as adm irab le, b oth m is s ed the op p ortu nity to
ex am ine m ore deep ly the s cop e ofan im p lied licens e on a q u as i-op en
p art of a p rop erty ’s cu rtilage.228 The cou rt als o p as s ed on an
op p ortu ne occas ion w here it cou ld hav e s ettled the s tatu s ofSta te v.
Cre a as the au thoritativ e M innes ota p recedent on ev idence ob tained
from an im p liedly op en driv ew ay .As a res u lt, the m ajority ’s decis ion
contradicts p rior p recedent229 and creates new difficu lties for
p ros ecu tion,ev en w hen the ev idence is w ithin p lain s ight.
226. Se e Peop le v .Defore,1 50 N .E.58 5,5 8 7 (N .Y.1 926).
227 . Se e State v .Chu te,90 8 N .W .2d 57 8 ,5 8 3 –8 8 (M inn.201 8 ).
228 . Se e id .at 5 8 3 –92.
229. Se e State v .Crea,3 0 5 M inn.3 4 2,23 3 N .W .2d 7 3 6 (1 97 5).
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